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INTRODUCTION 
Drought affects more North Americans than any other natural hazard.
1
  
Over the past two decades, it has returned to the American West with 
historic intensity.  The long drought of 2000–06 across the Great Plains 
resulted in record low stream flows and record low reservoir levels; in 
Kansas, it compelled a record number of surface water rights curtailments.
2
  
The Colorado River Basin is caught in the throes of a fifteen-year drought 
that has reduced water levels in the two largest reservoirs in the United 
States, Lake Mead and Lake Powell, to unprecedented lows.
3
  California is 
experiencing its worst drought since 1976–77, and possibly since 1580.
4
  
Chronic water shortages have driven at least ten states to litigation presently 
before the Supreme Court of the United States, and most of these cases 
involve western waters.
5
  Unlike the Dust Bowl era, when Farm Security 
Administration photographs of dry streambeds and drought-stricken fields 
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 1.  Kansas Drought Watch, U.S.GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://ks.water.usgs.gov/ks-drought 
(last visited May 13, 2014). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Michael Wines, Colorado River Drought Forces a Painful Reckoning for States, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at A1; Felicity Barringer, Lake Mead Hits Record Low Level, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 
18, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/lake-mead-hits-record-low-level. 
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2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/23/local/la-me-drought-weakness-20140223. 
 5.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (interstate litigation over the Republican River 
Compact); Montana v. Wyoming, 129 S. Ct. 480 (2008) (interstate litigation over the Yellowstone 
River Compact); Texas v. New Mexico, 134 S. Ct 1050 (2014) (pending) (interstate litigation over 
the Rio Grande Compact); Florida v. Georgia, No. 152 Orig. (interstate litigation over the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin).  The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin 
includes parts of Alabama as well, but Alabama is not included in the last lawsuit, which, unlike the 
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provoked outraged skepticism from opponents of the New Deal,
6
 no one 
doubts the current drought.  It can be seen from space.
7
 
This drought is an economic and environmental problem of the highest 
order, but does it necessarily pose a legal problem?  After all, western water 
law is built for aridity in general and for drought in particular.  The typical 
western water right is a practical thing, a property right that balances two 
different aspects of time: the annual variability of precipitation in the arid 
West, and the legal permanence of the right itself.  It entitles its owner to use 
a specific amount of water every year from a stream, river, or lake, subject to 
that water being available, and within a permanent priority system 
encompassing all other such rights.
8
  To protect investments in the surface 
irrigation systems that primarily watered the West between the 1860s and 
the 1950s, these rights usually enjoy the status of permanent, real property 
rights.
9
  Interstate water compacts, which protect water rights within each 
state, are likewise perpetual.
10
  Even the worst droughts eventually end, and 
the western water right survives them. 
The more serious drought, in terms of both scale and time, is 
underground, especially across the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer.
11
  The 
United States has depleted more than 804 million acre-feet of groundwater 
since 1900; and over a third of that total (about 276 million acre-feet) has 
been withdrawn from the Ogallala.  That figure is nearly twice as much as 
all of the groundwater withdrawn from the West’s alluvial groundwater 
basins combined (approximately 144 million acre-feet).
12
  And the rate of 
                                                          
 6.  ERROL MORRIS, BELIEVING IS SEEING: OBSERVATIONS ON THE MYSTERIES OF 
PHOTOGRAPHY 125 (2011). 
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at 4–5, 22, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2013), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2013/5079.  I 
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depletion is accelerating: between 2000 and 2008, the Ogallala lost more 
than 8.3 million acre-feet per year, a rate twice that of the previous decade.
13
  
At that rate, groundwater pumping depletes the Ogallala every two years by 
a volume greater than the annual flow of the waters of the Colorado River 
Basin.
14
  This drought is also more serious because the Ogallala depletion is 
permanent.  Unlike the flows of the Colorado and other western rivers, 
which vary according to mountain snowpack and summer storms, the 
Ogallala is not coming back: across most of its range, it is effectively non-
rechargeable.
15
  Water levels across the Ogallala in eastern Colorado fell by 
as much as forty feet between 1980 and 1997.
16
  Across western Kansas, the 
saturated thickness of the Ogallala has fallen in some places by over 150 
feet,
17
 a sixty percent decline from its original thickness.
18
  The Ogallala 
falls in wet years, and it falls in drought years. 
This depletion is the product of the groundwater revolution.  Between 
the territorial era and World War II, almost all of the irrigated farms across 
the Great Plains were clustered near surface water bodies.  The advent of 
groundwater irrigation technology in the 1950s transformed the region and 
its inhabitants’ relationship with water, allowing irrigation wherever they 
could access the Ogallala.  In Nebraska, for example, surface irrigation 
acreage has remained relatively constant since 1970, at roughly one million 
acres; but groundwater irrigation expanded from about 500,000 acres in 
                                                          
have converted the report’s metric figures to acre-feet, the standard volumetric unit in western water 
law (1 cubic kilometer = 810,713.194 acre-feet). An acre-foot of water is 325,850 gallons. 
 13.  Id. at 7.  
 14.  The Colorado River Compact apportioned 15 million acre-feet (maf) annually. Colorado 
River Compact, 45 Stat. 1057, at art. III(a) (1922) (apportioning 7.5 maf to the Upper Basin and the 
Lower Basin states respectively). Yet the average flow of the Colorado River between 1930 and 
1996 was 13.9 maf/year, and is “generally treated as a reasonable estimate of the reliable supply.”  
JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY, & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL 
CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 701 (3d ed. 2000) (citing Dale Pontius, Colorado River Basin 
Study, app. B, at 6 (Report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, 1998). 
 15.  KONIKOW, supra note 12, at 22.  
 16.  Ralf Topper, Karen L. Spray, William H. Bellis, Judith L. Hamilton, & Peter E. Barkmann, 
Ground Water Atlas of Colorado, COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2003), 
http://geosurvey.state.co.us/water/GroundwaterAtlas/Pages/GroundwaterAtlasofColorado.aspx. 
 17.  Change in Saturated Thickness, Predevelopment to Average 2011-2013, KAN. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2013), 
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Water%20Levels/index.html#Saturated%2520Thickn
ess%2520Change%2520-%2520Predevelopment%2520to%25202013.jpg.  
 18.  Percent Change in Saturated Thickness, Predevelopment to Average 2010-2012, Kansas 




1266 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
1950 to seven million acres in 1990.
19
  By the end of the twentieth century, 
as much as ninety percent of the water used for irrigation in Kansas was 
drawn from the Ogallala.
20
 
The groundwater revolution has disturbed the balance of western water 
in two ways.  First, it has disturbed the balance between annual and 
permanent time.  Unlike the surface waters of the West, its groundwater 
systems are insulated from annual variability, easily accessible for irrigation, 
and vast.  Irrigators eagerly developed these large groundwater supplies, and 
western legislatures accommodated that expansion in various ways.  The 
concern about variability dissipated, but belief in the need for legal 
permanence remained.  As a result, the western water right, applied and 
adapted to groundwater, became something less practical and more abstract, 
because the chances and the consequences of an underground water shortage 
seemed remote compared to the droughts that regularly shorted surface 
water systems.  That underground shortage is now all too real, as 
communities above the Ogallala face the dark side of the groundwater 
revolution.  Second, that revolution has also disturbed the balance of the 
Ogallala as a hydrological system.  Decades of excessive groundwater 
pumping have distorted its hydrology, putting it into the condition of quasi-
permanent if not permanent drought, drought that is the product not of 
climatic patterns, but of human activity. 
This imbalance is a serious legal problem.  Six decades of intensive 
groundwater irrigation across the West have made the depletion of the 
Ogallala permanent, and four decades of legislative initiatives intended to 
staunch that depletion have largely failed.  The problem of depletion and the 
failure to address it by regulation have exposed the shortcomings of a legal 
regime largely beholden to the inherited assumption that the water supply is 
annually variable but nonetheless permanent.  The permanence of the 
Ogallala is altogether different—it is a permanence of decline.  Water rights 
that assume legal permanence must fail when the supply upon which they 
depend declines permanently. 
Like many revolutions, the groundwater revolution made the past 
obsolete—temporarily.  But in this post-revolutionary age of permanent 
depletion, the past has become more relevant than ever.  This article 
attempts to bring some of the more important lessons of western water law, 
                                                          
 19. Vincent H. Dreeszen, Water Availability and Use, in ROBERT D. KUZELKA & CHARLES 
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 20.  CHARLES A. PERRY, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EFFECTS OF IRRIGATION PRACTICES ON 
WATER USE IN THE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS WITHIN THE KANSAS HIGH PLAINS, 
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especially Kansas water law, to bear upon the crisis of the Ogallala.  Part I 
places the modern property right in Ogallala groundwater within its ancestral 
contexts: the context in which the western water right was first generated as 
a property right in the nineteenth century, and the context in which that right 
came to be regulated by the middle of the twentieth century.  Part II surveys 
how three Ogallala states (Colorado, Nebraska, and especially Kansas) made 
legal adjustments to accommodate the groundwater revolution.  Within their 
respective legal regimes, these states produced a practically expanded 
property right in Ogallala groundwater, and they succeeded wildly in 
granting new Ogallala rights; but they largely failed to produce a regulatory 
regime that could effectively account for and protect such a right.  
Consequently, there has emerged a growing disparity between legal fiction 
and hydrological reality.  Part III attempts to explain how Kansas has 
responded to this disparity.  Both irrigators and regulators have largely 
avoided the principal legal tools to protect Ogallala water rights, preferring 
instead to employ alternative contractual and regulatory mechanisms. 
This practice of avoidance raises troubling similarities with the legal 
situation of the early West itself, where received eastern water law was so 
foreign both to hydrological reality and to prevailing customs that it quickly 
and justifiably lost its cultural and political legitimacy.  But in this age of 
permanent depletion and post-natural drought, we cannot afford to lose the 
legitimacy of our legal regime for water, a regime that was generated by 
western conditions of permanent scarcity.  Such a loss would be legally 
unjustifiable, profoundly regrettable, and relentlessly litigious.  To allay 
such a possible threat, Part IV concludes this article with four historical 
observations that recommend certain legal and policy reforms to address the 
permanent depletion of the Ogallala.  As Kansas issues a “call to action for a 
vision for the future of water in Kansas,”
21
 it would be wise to keep the past 
and its lessons prominently in view. 
I. THE BASES OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT IN WESTERN GROUNDWATER 
Western water law is a peculiar genre of American property law that 
evolved into doctrinal maturity during the rough and exceptional half-
century between the California Gold Rush of 1848–49 and the Reclamation 
Act of 1902.
22
  The first appropriated western water supplies were drawn 
                                                          
 21.  Vision for the Future of Water in Kansas, KAN. WATER OFFICE, 
http://www.kwo.org/50_Year_Vision/50_Year_Vision.htm  (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 22.  See, e.g., SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 46–306 (1905) 
(discussing the application of water rights in the western United States in 1905).  
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from the rivers flowing down from mountains—the Sangre de Cristo Range 
in New Mexico and Colorado, the Wasatch Front in Utah, the western slopes 
of the Sierra Nevada in California, and the Front Range of the Rocky 
Mountains of Colorado.  While early commentators noted that alluvial 
groundwater, artesian springs, and shallow groundwater formations such as 
the Dakota Aquifer in Kansas could provide for irrigation,
23
 technological 
limitations limited early groundwater development to shallow wells that 
irrigated small acreages.
24
  Surface water development dominated this 
seminal and most formative period of western water law, and so many of the 
assumptions, principles, and attributes of the surface water right, for better 
and for worse, were generally translated to the various classifications of 
early groundwater rights.
25
  As western water codes adapted to the 
groundwater revolution starting in the 1950s, the surface water right 
inevitably exerted a most important influence—as a template which, 
depending upon the code and the situation, was to be closely copied, 
followed but modified, or rejected altogether.
26
  A generalized survey of this 
influential antecedent, termed here the “classical western water right,” is 
therefore appropriate. 
The classical western water right begins with the “imperative necessity” 
of western conditions,
27
 and it rests on three supporting imperatives: the 
need to accommodate the West’s physical situation, the need to provide a 
defensible private property interest in the use of water, and the need to 
regulate and administer that private interest in balance with public interests. 
The first imperative concerns the physical situation of most of the 
West—its climate, hydrology, and topography.  West of the 98th Meridian, 
the climate is generally too arid to raise crops without irrigation.
28
  This 
                                                          
 23.  ERASMUS HAWORTH, UNDERGROUND WATERS OF SOUTHWESTERN KANSAS 37–42, 48–56 
(U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey eds., 1897).   
 24.  See GEORGE S. KNAPP ET AL., THE APPROPRIATION OF WATER FOR BENEFICIAL PURPOSES: 
A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON HISTORIC, PHYSICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM IN 
KANSAS 13–14 (1944) [hereinafter 1944 REPORT] (noting the increase in well drilling in the 1930s). 
 25.  WIEL, supra note 22, at 124–36.  
 26.  See infra Part II.  
 27.  Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).  
 28.  John Wesley Powell chose the 100th Meridian because it roughly corresponded to the 
twenty-inch isohyet—the cartographic line connecting points receiving twenty inches of annual 
precipitation.  JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH 12–13 (Wallace Stegner ed., 
2d ed. 1879).  See also DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE LIFE OF JOHN WESLEY 
POWELL 355, 348–49 (2001).  Later geographers and legislation moved that line one to two degrees 
east.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 42-301 to -311 (relating to the use of water for industrial purposes 
west of the 99th Meridian).  The Flood Control Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701–709 (1996), drew the 
line between western irrigation use and eastern navigation use at the 98th Meridian.  33 U.S.C. § 
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aridity meant that most early western farms were dry-land farms, wholly 
dependent upon excessive and anomalous amounts of precipitation, unless 
water could be obtained from off the farm.  Where available, that water was 
found in the West’s sparse and irregular rivers.  The flows of rivers 
originating in western mountains vary mostly according to annual snowpack 
at the higher altitudes of their tributary streams.  By contrast, the rivers that 
gather water across the High Plains, such as the Smoky Hill, Cimarron, or 
Republican Rivers, depend mostly on rain falling during the growing 
season.
29
  In either case, the flows of western rivers vary substantially from 
month to month and from year to year, much more so than that of eastern 
rivers;
30
 but until the advent of large-scale groundwater irrigation, they 
flowed every year, even when their flows went underground.
31
  Many of 
them still do, because their supplies mostly derive from the hydrologic cycle, 
which is an annual cycle.
32
 
Farmers who sought to access these annually variable but perpetual 
water supplies faced the challenge of western topography, whose mountain 
ranges, high parks and basins, and deep valleys and canyons placed 
formidable obstacles between water supplies and arable land.  Early irrigated 
farms diverted small amounts of water from nearby or adjacent streams.
33
  
As demand for water increased, irrigators and irrigation entities found it 
necessary to move water across longer distances, from alpine and subalpine 
basins with little arable land to more temperate and arable ones, and from 
water-rich basins to water-short ones.
34
  The physical situation of the West 
made irrigation necessary; it forced irrigators to confront highly variable but 
                                                          
701-1(b) (1996).   
 29.  H.A. RICE & ROGER C. RICE, THE RELATION OF THE KANSAS WATER COMMISSION TO THE 
FLOOD PROBLEM OF KANSAS 9 (U.S. Geological Survey ed., 1918) (precipitation over Kansas is of 
the “plains type,” where seventy-one to seventy-eight percent of the annual total falls during the 
crop-growing season); HAWORTH, supra note 23, at 62–63 (discussing irrigation development in the 
Kansas portion of the Cimarron River). 
 30.  DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 3, 
n.3 (8th ed. 2010).  
 31.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 14 (discussing the variations of flow of the Cimarron River 
according to natural hydrological conditions). 
 32.  THOMAS C. WINTER, JUDSON W. HARVEY, O. LEHN FRANKE, & WILLIAM M. ALLEY, 
GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 2–5 (U.S. Geological Survey ed., 
1998). 
 33.  ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 42–43 (Richard 
T. Ely ed., 1903) (discussing Mormon pioneers diverting water from [Salt Lake] City Creek in 
1847); id. at 143–44 (discussing early irrigation from the South Platte and Cache la Poudre Rivers in 
Colorado).  
 34.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 456 (1922) (discussing Colorado’s trans-
basin diversions of the Laramie River).  
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generally permanent water supplies; and it provided incentives to move 
water from where it was less valuable to where it was more valuable.  Early 
diversion works for mining in California could extend more than sixty miles 
and cost millions.
35
  Early irrigation canals near Garden City, Kansas cost 
over a million dollars as well.
36
 
This physical and financial situation produced the second imperative of 
the classical western water right: the need to recognize and then protect the 
private property interest in the diversion, transportation, and use of water.  
The process of recognition began through custom and by analogy, mostly by 
applying established mining principles to water.  In the wake of the Mexican 
War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which granted “Alta California” 
to the United States, most mining camps originally lay within the public 
domain, and the federal government neither asserted title to nor granted 
away its land, its mineral rights, or its water rights.  In that legal vacuum, the 
miners’ customs asserted themselves.
37
  These customary rules governed the 
acquisition, holding, and forfeiture of individual mining claims, based upon 
priority of discovery and diligence in working them.  Because water was a 
necessary incident to placer (and later, hydraulic) mining, miners applied a 
fundamental principle of claiming mineral rights to claiming water rights: 
the first to divert and to use the water had the exclusive right to it.  In the 
absence of specific state or federal laws, these and other customary rules of 
the mining camps became locally recognized as valid claims to water.
38
 
Recognition of such a right under state law, however, posed obstacles 
potentially as formidable as the western mountains.  Miners were neither 
judges nor lawyers, and when they entered the wilderness to stake their 
claims, they committed a breach of precedent, leaving “behind them much of 
the established law of real property.”
39
  Their assertion of water rights defied 
the law.  Western legislatures had adopted the English common law as the 
rule of decision, and California initially refused to recognize mining customs 
when they conflicted with state law.
40
  The California Supreme Court 
                                                          
 35.  See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BREWER, UP AND DOWN CALIFORNIA IN 1860-1864: THE JOURNAL 
OF WILLIAM H. BREWER 400–01 (Francis P. Farquhar ed., 1930) (describing diversion works from 
the Stanislaus River to the mining town of Sonora, constructed at a cost of $1.5 million in the 1850s, 
and destroyed by flood in 1862–63).  
 36.  MEAD, supra note 33, at 336. 
 37.  WIEL, supra note 22, at 2. 
 38.  WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 166 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 39.  WIEL, supra note 22, at 4. 
 40.  Id. at 6. After the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 established the territories of Kansas and 
Nebraska, both territories adopted the common law of England. 1855 Kan. Sess. Laws 469; 1855 
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followed these statutes, at least as far as it could apply them “to the novel 
question growing out of the peculiar enterprises in which many of the people 
of this State are embarked.”
41
  Stuck between a statutory dictate to obey the 
common law, citizens who ignored that law, and natural conditions that 
discredited that law, the California courts understandably looked for an 
escape.  In 1855, they found it, in the landmark case of Irwin v. Phillips.
42
  
The controversy in Irwin took place on public land, so the court did not 
consider itself constrained by statutes nullifying the miners’ customs.
43
  That 
opening allowed the court to find that the customary right of a prior 
appropriator to divert water from a stream, convey it to another site, and use 
it there conferred rights superior to the claimant whose land bordered the 
stream, and who would have otherwise prevailed (as a riparian possessor) at 
common law.  “Courts are bound to take notice of the political and social 
condition of the country, which they judicially rule,” wrote the court.
44
  In 
accepting the custom of prior appropriation, the courts based their decisions 
on “the peculiar condition of things” in California, which had no precedent 
in the English common law.
45
  Less than a decade after the Gold Rush had 
begun, mining customs as applied to water had become securely established 
in California.
46
  By 1857, the California Supreme Court confidently stated 
“the right to appropriate the waters of the streams of this State, for mining 
and other purposes, has been too long settled to admit of any doubt or 
discussion at this time.”
47
  Congress subsequently enacted statutes expressly 
protecting water rights so obtained.
48
  In construing these statutes and the 
                                                          
Neb. Laws 328.  By 1855 that doctrine had evolved in response to the water-power demands of the 
industrial revolution. See JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 271–
79 (2004). 
 41.  Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252–53 (1853). 
 42.  5 Cal. 140 (1855). 
 43.  This finding drew the accusation of judicial activism; and the Court, in a subsequent 
decision, defended itself by explaining that taking judicial notice of local customs was an established 
precept of the common law the legislature had statutorily adopted.  See Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 
548, 555–56 (1856) (“That new conditions and new facts may produce the novel application of a 
rule which has not been before applied, in like manner, does not make it any less the common law; 
for the latter is a system of grand principles, founded upon the mature and perfected reason of 
centuries.”). 
 44.  Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146. 
 45.  Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 48 (1857). 
 46.  Advocates for common law riparianism vigorously contested the holding in Irwin, and 
received support from Chief Justice Murray in this effort.  See, e.g., Conger, 6 Cal. at 559 (Murray, 
J., dissenting).  However, in Crandall v. Woods, Chief Justice Murray relented.  8 Cal. 136 (1857). 
Later cases failed to overturn Irwin.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining 
Co., 13 Cal. 220 (1859); Logan v. Driscoll, 19 Cal. 623 (1862).  
 47.  Hill v. King, 8 Cal. 336, 338 (1857). 
 48.  See, e.g., Mining Act of 1866, Act July 26, 1866, c. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 30 
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California cases, the Supreme Court of the United States repeatedly ruled for 
the miners, “who were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, 
upon the public lands in the State.”
49
 
Elevated from custom to law, the doctrine of prior appropriation spread 
eastward to Colorado in the Gold Rush of 1859.  Aside from the usual 
western problem with the English common law, Colorado also faced a 
conflict between prior appropriation and other earlier customs.  The first 
settlers of European descent in Colorado were the Spanish and Spanish–
American farmers who settled near the Rio Grande in the San Luis Valley.
50
  
Spanish water law featured a communitarian approach to the allocation of 
water during times of drought—one that took place according to need, rather 
than priority.
51
  Due to the Mexican War and to differences in ethnicity, 
religion, and language, Anglo-American westerners did not recognize 
Hispanic water law as legitimate.
52
  Other customary water law came from 
Mormon pioneers who were among the first Anglo settlers in Colorado.  
Mormon water law also held that the right to use water belonged to the 
group, and not to its individual members.
53
  Across the San Luis Valley, 
some of the earliest fights over water in Colorado engaged not only 
competing water users, but competing doctrines as well.
54
  The potential for 
further conflict continued after the Colorado Territory became established 
separately from the Kansas Territory in 1861.  Its territorial legislature 
enacted water laws that were largely in accordance with the equitable 
principles of Spanish and Mormon doctrines.
55
 
The seniority of these rival doctrines posed a potential problem for the 
                                                          
U.S.C. § 51); Act July 9, 1870, c. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 52); Desert Lands 
Act of 1877, c. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 641–48).  
 49.  Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457–58 (1878). See also Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507 
(1874); Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670 (1874).  
 50.  MEAD, supra note 33, at 143. Mead committed an error still common among Anglos, 
referring to the original settlers as “Mexicans.” Id.  
 51.  MICHAEL C.  MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
HISTORY, 1550–1850, at 147–64 (1984).  See generally JOHN O.  BAXTER, DIVIDING NEW MEXICO’S 
WATERS, 1700–1912 (1997).   
 52. See MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS & LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 11–54 
(1994). 
 53. MEAD, supra note 33, at 42–44, 233.   
 54. See VIRGINIA MCCONNELL SIMMONS, THE SAN LUIS VALLEY: LAND OF THE SIX-ARMED 
CROSS 219–24 (2d ed. 1999) (recounting how, in 1879, earlier settlers built dams to keep Mormons 
from withdrawing irrigation water from the Conejos River, and Mormon settlers responded by 
tearing down the dams).   
 55.  See, e.g., 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67, §§ 1, 4 (adopting the doctrines of riparian rights and 
equitable apportionment respectively); 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 48, § 13. Mead took note of the 1861 
laws that required permanent appurtenance; these were largely adopted in Wyoming in 1876.  
MEAD, supra note 33, at 83. 
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advocates of prior appropriation.
56
  Colorado fundamentally resolved the 
problem in 1876, when it enshrined the doctrine in its constitution at 
statehood.
57
  So authorized, the Colorado Supreme Court, in its seminal 
water law decision six years later, dismissed these earlier doctrines.
58
  The 
law of prior appropriation had entered Kansas statutes, also in 1876.
59
  
Nebraska followed suit, first by statute in 1889, and then by amending its 
constitution in 1920.
60
  Across the West, these enactments acknowledged the 
cultural authority of prior appropriation and the political imperative to 
protect these property rights.  For the next half-century, surface water 
irrigation developed from the foothills of the Rockies downstream to the 
High Plains.  By 1884, Colorado had developed over a million acres of 
irrigated land.
61
  By 1889, canals in the Colorado portion of the San Luis 
Valley extended for almost 1,200 miles, “and were capable of supplying 
water to a million and half acres—had there been enough water to do so.”
62
  
In western Kansas, the main canals on the Arkansas River had been 
developed by the 1880s, irrigating around 65,000 acres and entirely 
diverting whatever flows escaped from Colorado.
63
  These developments 
were aided substantially by statutes allowing for the incorporation of 
irrigation companies and granting them valuable legal rights and 
protections.
64
  Surface irrigation also spread to the valleys of more remote 
                                                          
 56.  See, e.g., Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 570 (1872). 
 57.  COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6. 
 58.  Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).  Such dismissal appears to have 
contradicted both the 1861 and 1862 session laws, which allowed for equitable apportionment.  1861 
Colo. Sess. Laws 67, § 4; 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 48, § 13.  For a fuller discussion of this apparent 
contradiction, see Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Peña, Community Acequias in Colorado’s Rio 
Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 387, 399–400 (2003).  The late Professor Joseph Sax recognized the contradiction in 1990.  See 
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
257, 268 & n.34 (1990) (criticizing Coffin as the foundational example of “judicial revisionism in 
reading the Territorial legislature’s riparian statutes” of 1861, 1862, and 1864—statutes that the 
Colorado Supreme Court “blatantly misinterpreted”). 
 59.  1876 Kan. Sess. Laws 153–55. 
 60.  1889 Neb. Laws 503–04; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (“The right to divert unappropriated 
waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is 
demanded  by the public interest.”). 
 61.  MEAD, supra note 33, at 144. 
 62.  DOUGLAS R. LITTLEFIELD, CONFLICT ON THE RIO GRANDE: WATER AND THE LAW, 1879-
1939, at 35–36 (2008). 
 63.  JAMES EARL SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS 
ARKANSAS RIVER, 1870-1950 79–92 (1991).  In a telling example of the cultural power of prior 
appropriation, no riparian owner on the Arkansas River between the Colorado and Oklahoma state 
lines ever challenged an irrigator’s right to divert from the Arkansas River. 1944 REPORT, supra note 
24, at 45. 
 64.  See, e.g., 1866 Kan. Sess. Laws 124–38; 1923 Kan. Sess. Laws 205 (preserving the 
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basins of the Great Plains, such as the Pioneer Ditch on the North Fork 
Republican River in northeastern Colorado and northwestern Nebraska,
65
 
and even to the Cimarron River Valley of southwestern Kansas, where it had 
progressed “to a considerable extent” by the end of the nineteenth century.
66
 
Less than a generation after the Gold Rush era, prior appropriation had 
obtained constitutional and statutory authority across much of the West, 
based on its twofold claim to accommodate the West’s physical realities and 
to secure property rights in water.  Yet by the turn of the twentieth century, 
irrigation experts such as Elwood Mead had assayed that claim and found it 
wanting.  In his opinion, the doctrine was a comprehensive mess that 
rendered impossible any accurate understanding of how westerners had 
actually allocated their water supplies.  Most appropriators did not know 
how much water they were diverting, how much they had even claimed, or 
how much their lands needed.  Thus, they had no regard whatsoever for 
future water needs, and made grossly excessive claims.  They posted 
different claims of water to the same tract of land, either in competition with 
one another or by mistake.  These errors produced a problem as old as prior 
appropriation itself: that of over-appropriation, where the quantities set forth 
in decreed water rights vastly exceeded the supply the stream could give, 
even in wet years.
67
  Lawyers and litigation contributed to the myth that 
prior appropriation was well-suited to settle western waters for irrigation.  
“It is a fairly satisfactory law for the miner,” concluded Mead, “but a poor 
law for the irrigator.”
68
  For experts who shared Mead’s opinion, prior 
                                                          
common law).  In 1886, the Kansas legislature passed a notice-posting statute, making clear that 
“[a]s between appropriators, the one first in time is the first in right.”  1886 Kan. Sess. Laws 154.  
Nebraska passed its first irrigation law in 1877, classifying canals as internal improvements and 
granting irrigation corporations the power to condemn rights of way.  1877 Neb. Laws 168; MEAD, 
supra note 33, at 291.  As with Kansas, a later statute clarified the rights of prior appropriators.  See 
1889 Neb. Laws. 503–06.  
 65.  The Republican River Compact explicitly recognized the right of the Pioneer Canal to 
divert fifty cubic feet per second (cfs) of water from the North Fork Republican River in Colorado to 
irrigate lands in both Colorado and Nebraska.  Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, 89 
(1943).  This right was settled, and its 1890 priority blessed, by Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 
259 U.S. 498, syl. ¶ 2 (1922).  
 66.  HAWORTH, supra note 23, at 62.   
 67.  MEAD, supra note 33, at 145–59 (describing over-appropriation in Colorado).  See id. at 
150–51 (calculating the total appropriations for the Cache La Poudre River in Colorado at 4,632 
cubic feet per second, as compared to an August average flow in the river of between 141 and 162 
cubic feet per second).  
 68.  Id. at 299 (regarding irrigation code of Montana).  Mead quoted one “Professor S. Fortier, 
of Bozeman, Montana,” who wryly described one water fight as “the old familiar story of heroic 
efforts to subdue a desert and at the same time maintain an action in court over a contested water 
right.”  Id. at 307.  Powell acknowledged the success of mining districts in managing the regulation 
of mining lands and water use, but his insistence on statutory remedies was based on a mistrust of 
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appropriation even threatened justice, sound planning, and the general 
welfare.
69
  But by 1900, the doctrine was deeply anchored in state law, and 
millions of acres of irrigated land across the West relied upon it.  Indeed, the 
most comprehensive attempt to respond to its deleterious effects—the 
Reclamation Act of 1902—expressly deferred to state law.
70
  The 
Reclamation Act’s blessing of state water law in general and of prior 
appropriation in particular has survived a century of amendments.
71
 
If the prior appropriation system were to realize its claim to “promote[] 
investment by giving security of use,”
72
 then it would have to be regulated in 
a secure fashion, and at the state law level.  Therein lay the third imperative 
behind the classical western water right: the need to regulate it as a reliable 
property right, and in accordance with the public interest.  The evolution and 
maturation of Kansas water law in the first half of the twentieth century 
reveals how one western state achieved such a form of regulation. 
From statehood through World War II, the doctrines of riparianism and 
prior appropriation coexisted in Kansas, at first without much controversy.
73
  
After 1917, the Kansas legislature gradually developed an administrative 
system for water rights, including the formation of the Division of Water 
                                                          
the courts: “it hardly seems wise to imperil interests so great by intrusting them to the possibility of 
some future court made law.”  POWELL, supra note 28, at 41, 43.   
 69.  Robert A. Manley, The Desert Shall Rejoice and Blossom as the Rose!, in FLAT WATER: A 
HISTORY OF NEBRASKA AND ITS WATER, supra note 19, at 30 (citing the opinion of Frederick 
Newell, the first director of the Reclamation Service, in 1902).  
 70.  Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 
(2006)). 
 71.  The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, tit. II, 96 Stat. 1261 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1 (2006)); see generally Amy K. Kelley & Reed D. 
Benson, Federal Reclamation Law, in ROBERT E. BECK & AMY K. KELLEY, 2 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS §§ 41.03(c) to 41.04(b) (3d ed. 2008) (Supp. 2012) (tracing history of the reclamation 
program from “[w]hen the reclamation program was born in 1902” to its modern form). 
 72.  CHARLES J. MEYERS, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 6 (1971).  
 73.  Eastern Kansas followed the riparian doctrine, by which the reasonable use of water was an 
inherent common law attribute of riparian property.  Such a doctrine suited the wetter climate of 
eastern Kansas, its many streams and rivers, and the developed industrial uses of water at the 
riverbank.  Early litigation in Kansas water law usually concerned such industrial uses.  See, e.g., 
Shamleffer v. Council Grove Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24 (1877); Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588 
(1881).  As early as 1866, western Kansas followed the prior appropriation doctrine, which formally 
entered Kansas statutes in 1876.  See Kan. L. 1876, ch. 58.  In 1886, the legislature passed a notice-
posting statute, making clear that “as between appropriators, the first in time is the first in right.”  
Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571, 572 (Kan. 1905) (discussing 1886 law and subsequent amendments).  
Subsequent statutes elaborated on the 1886 law.  Kan. L. 1889, chs. 95, 165.  The 1891 legislature 
appears to have collected the extant water statutes and placed them in some sort of order.  See 
generally, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-302 (2013) (citing Kan. L. 1891, ch. 133, art. 1, § 2). 
  
1276 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Resources (DWR).
74
  Over the same general period, Kansas courts 
repeatedly denied efforts to adopt prior appropriation exclusively.
75
  Starting 
with the Dust Bowl, however, Kansans began to realize that this hybrid law 
code was no longer working well as a means to establish and to protect 
water rights.  The severe droughts of the “dirty thirties” and the Republican 
River flood of 1935 convinced leaders across Kansas, Nebraska, and 
Colorado that the states would require federal assistance to construct 
sustainable irrigation projects and flood control works.  This shared 
realization produced a cooperative response among the states, culminating in 
the Republican River Compact of 1943.
76
  However, the compact raised 
fundamental concerns about the merits of Kansas water law.  Those 
concerns intensified significantly in 1944, when the Kansas Supreme Court 
ruled that Kansas water law was ineffective in attempting to impose 
administrative control over the use of groundwater.
77
 
In response to these developments at both the interstate and intrastate 
levels, Governor Andrew F. Schoeppel appointed a select committee to 
review Kansas water law in a comprehensive way, and to provide 
recommendations for its proper reformation.
78
  As part of its review, the 
committee engaged outside lawyers, economists, irrigation experts, and 
                                                          
 74.  Most revisions to pre-1945 Kansas water statutes (Chapter 42) between 1923 and 1945 
consist of adjustments made necessary by the Kansas Water Commission Act of 1917 (Kan. L. 1917, 
ch. 172), the formation of the Division of Water Resources (Kan. L. 1927, ch. 293), and the 
authorization of the office of the chief engineer (Kan. L. 1933, ch. 271, § 7).  In 1941, the Kansas 
legislature repealed the notice-posting statutes of 1886.  Kan. L. 1941, ch. 261, § 1.  
 75.  See, e.g., Clark, 80 P. at 573–74 (Kan. 1905) (noting the lack of historical understanding 
and legislative suggestion to broaden the doctrine); Feldhut v. Brummitt, 150 P. 549, 550 (Kan. 
1915) (producing the same result but in the context of denying specific performance).  In 1936, the 
Kansas Supreme Court reconciled riparianism with prior appropriation, holding that any person 
holding a riparian right or an appropriation right under the 1886 statute does not have priority against 
a senior riparian owner or a riparian owner holding land patents issued before 1886.  See Frizell v. 
Bindley, 58 P.2d 95, 100–02 (Kan. 1936).  Frizell consequently held that R.S. 42-101 (1923), which 
had authorized the riparian owner to appropriate water for irrigation purposes, was ineffectual to 
confer on such an owner priority as against riparian owners under pre-1866 patents.  Such a result 
followed the “California Doctrine,” as most notably set forth in Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 
1886), followed by nine states in its heyday; today, only California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma 
subscribe to that doctrine, albeit in different ways.  The legislature repealed R.S. 42-101 in 1941.  
Kan. L. 1941, ch. 261.  Smith v. Miller, 75 P.2d 273, 273–74 (Kan. 1938), reaffirmed the riparian 
landowner’s common law ownership of the water running through the land.  
 76.  Act of May 26, 1943, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86, 86 (1943) (Kan. L. 1943, ch. 335, § 1) (codified 
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-518. 
 77.  See State ex rel. Peterson, Co. v. Board of Agric., 149 P.2d 604, 607–09 (Kan. 1944) 
(favoring a broad, common law approach).  
 78.  See 1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 7–8 (listing appointment process and committee 
members). 
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bankers from Kansas, Nebraska, and the federal government.
79
  The 
committee’s work provides a clear summary of the four principal changes 
which such a reformation required. 
The first change concerned power.  In response to State, ex rel. v. Board 
of Agriculture,
80
 it was imperative that the state, through DWR, be placed in 
control of all of the state’s waters, both surface and groundwater.  The 
prominent water law expert Wells A. Hutchins,
81
 then a senior irrigation 
economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, stressed that 
groundwater must be placed within the same legal regime as surface water, 
so that they could be regulated together as one system.  Otherwise, excessive 
groundwater pumping would be allowed to intercept baseflows to the river, 
extinguishing rights to the latter.
82
  Other members agreed, echoing 
Hutchins’s comments.
83
  The committee clearly took these comments to 
heart.  To protect “those who invest the funds necessary to put water to 
beneficial use” and their “continued right to the use of the quantity they have 
developed, against injury through diminution of the supply by later would-be 




The second change concerned doctrine.  Because water was a renewable 
resource, the prior appropriation doctrine best protected those who had 
invested for the long term in its diversion and beneficial use.
85
  “It is a wise 
and sound principle of law,” stressed the committee, “that those who first 
put water to use should not have the supply injuriously diminished and their 
investments impaired by such later users.”
86
  And because the “protective 
features of the [prior] appropriation doctrine apply alike to both surface and 
groundwater,” the doctrine meshed well with the need for adequate 
                                                          
 79.  Transcript of Conference of the Governor’s Committee on the Appropriation of Water in 
Kansas, Oct. 16–17, 1944 [hereinafter Conference Transcript].  Notable among the participants were 
Spencer L. Baird, District Counsel for the Bureau of Reclamation, Amarillo, Texas; Wells A. 
Hutchins, Senior Irrigation Economist for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Berkeley, California; 
D. J. Robinson of the Federal Land Bank, Wichita, Kansas; John Riddell, Assistant Attorney General 
for Nebraska; and Dan S. Jones, Assistant Chief of the Nebraska Bureau of Irrigation, Water Power 
and Drainage.  George S. Knapp, Kansas chief engineer, chaired the committee. 
 80.  149 P.2d 604 (Kan. 1944). 
 81.  See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 38, at i. 
 82.  Conference Transcript, supra note 79, at 63, 81–83 (comments of Mr. Hutchins). 
 83.  Id. at 177–78 (comments of Chairman Knapp and Mr. Milford E. Rogers, Superintendent 
and Engineer, Water Supply Division, Department of Service, Wichita, Kansas).  
 84.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 16. 
 85.  See id. at 17–18 (distinguishing oil and water reserves and explaining the benefit of 
favoring private and public water conservation efforts).  
 86.  Id. at 18.  
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administrative control over all appropriations of water statewide.
87
 
The third change was related to both power and doctrine, and concerned 
the quantification of the state’s water resources.  It was imperative to be able 
to quantify those resources, because quantification was an essential step in 
making them available for appropriation and beneficial use.  The Republican 
River Compact had made water rights quantification a major issue.  By 
equitably allocating the waters of the basin among Colorado, Nebraska, and 
Kansas, the compact had made possible federal investment in Bureau of 
Reclamation reservoirs and irrigation projects.  Yet the riparian half of 
Kansas water law made it virtually impossible to quantify the amount of 
water that had been put to beneficial use east of the 99th Meridian;
88
 and that 
uncertainty raised Reclamation’s concerns about how much water might be 
available in Kansas for any Reclamation project.
89
  By contrast, Nebraska’s 
centralized system of (surface) water rights administration according to the 
prior appropriation doctrine defined and quantified the sum of that state’s 
water rights in its portion of the Republican River Basin, enabling the 
determination of the amount of water available to develop Reclamation 
projects.
90
  Unless Kansas could quantify its water rights under such a 
centralized legal regime that adopted prior appropriation statewide, 
Reclamation would not commit to investing in diversion, storage, and flood 
control works, because “of the uncertainty as to source of supply,” and 
because the legal rights undergirding such works would not be stable or 
secure.
91
  Such a centralized system, where a chief engineer supervised, 
monitored, and quantified all appropriation rights, clearly appealed to 
Kansans who sought federal support for multipurpose reservoir projects 
within their part of the basin.
92
  Without these changes at state law, the 




Finally, the committee stressed as a “fundamental principle” that the 
state has both the power and the “duty to control and conserve natural 
resources” including water, oil, gas, and the air “for the benefit of its 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 45. 
 88.  See supra notes 28 and 73. 
 89.  Conference Transcript, supra note 79, at 15 (comments of Mr. Baird of Reclamation).  
 90.  Id. at 36–37 (comments of Mr. Baird); id. at 130–31 (interchange between Jones and 
Watkins); Id. at 135–39 (Hutchins on the virtues of a centralized administrative system).  Mr. D.J. 
Robinson, of the Federal Land Bank of Wichita, Kansas, similarly voiced strong support for a 
centralized system “that would clarify the situation here in Kansas.”  Id. at 142.  
 91.  Id. at 22–23 (statement of Frederic H. Guild).   
 92.  Id. at 145–48 (comments of Mr. Knapp and Mr. Porter Ahrens of Scandia, Kansas).  
 93.  Id. at 151–57 (comments of Mr. Knapp and Mr. John M. Gray of Kirwin, Kansas).  
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inhabitants . . . .”
94
  Whereas many western states had established this 
principle in their state constitutions, and eastern states had clear judicial 
decisions affirming it, Kansas law lacked such an explicit statement, and the 
committee clearly believed that a reformed Kansas water law code must 
make such a public dedication clear.
95
 
In accord with these four recommended changes, the committee 
produced draft legislation
96
 that became, virtually intact, the Kansas Water 
Appropriation Act (KWAA).
97
  The KWAA endowed the chief engineer 
with clear and broad statutory authority over all the waters of Kansas, both 
surface and groundwater, to grant, protect, and administer water rights 
according to the doctrine of prior appropriation; the riparian doctrine was 
repudiated.
98
  The KWAA established mechanisms for recognizing and 
quantifying pre-existing water uses as vested rights,
99
 for quantifying and 
perfecting new appropriation rights,
100
 and for quantifying the effects of 
changes in existing water rights according to the same standards as those 
that applied to new rights.
101
  The KWAA placed the chief engineer under a 
statutory duty to grant applications for water rights, provided that the water 
was available for appropriation.
102
  Once granted, those water rights received 
the full protections of his authority in accordance with the prior 
appropriation doctrine.
103
  Finally, the KWAA dedicated “[a]ll water within 
the state of Kansas . . . to the use of the people of” Kansas,
104
 and charged 
the chief engineer to administer the KWAA “for the benefits and beneficial 
                                                          
 94.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 16. 
 95.  Id. at 27 (citing the Nebraska constitution); id. at 26 (citing Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 
U.S. 182, 185 (1923) (“[T]he State undoubtedly has power, and it is its duty, to control and conserve 
the use of its water resources for the benefit of all of its inhabitants . . . .”)). 
 96.  See id. at 45–52 (providing the text of the draft legislation that the committee suggested).   
 97.  Kan. L. 1945, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701 (Supp. 2012)).  For the 
standard treatment of the KWAA, see generally John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropriation Act: 
A Fifty-Year Perspective, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 735 (1995) (discussing the KWAA’s history and 
application); see also Myrl L. Duncan, High Noon on the Ogallala Aquifer: Agriculture Does Not 
Live by Farmland Preservation Alone, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 16 (1987) (tracing availability of land 
space to water supply for successful agriculture).  
 98.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-702, -706, -721 (2013) (authorizing and outlining the “duties 
of [the] chief engineer”). 
 99.  Id. §§ 82a-704a to -704b (providing rules to determine vested water rights). 
 100.  Id. §§ 82a-711 to -711a (creating new water rights); Id. §§ 82a-712 to -714 (perfecting the 
authorized quantities of new water rights). 
 101.  Id. § 82a-708b (containing provisions for owners to make various changes to water rights). 
 102.  Id. § 82a-711(a) (requiring the chief engineer to “consider the economics of diverting or 
pumping water for the water uses involved” and clarifying other duties). 
 103.  Id. § 82a-706 (directing the chief engineer to fulfill his duties according to the prior 
appropriation doctrine). 
 104.  Id. § 82a-702. 
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uses of all of its inhabitants,” not just the owners of or applicants for water 
rights,
105
 requiring him to limit his approval of new water rights and changes 
to existing water rights according to the public interest.
106
  The KWAA has 




The KWAA is a good example of how one western state domesticated 
the prior appropriation doctrine by establishing adequate administrative 
controls over the appropriation of water in order to prevent 
overdevelopment.
108
  The KWAA is largely predicated upon the 
hydrological inseparability of groundwater and surface water, and the 
administration of both supplies under the doctrine of prior appropriation.  
Despite reports of its demise, prior appropriation survives as a potent 
doctrine.
109
  While federal environmental law and water policy reforms have 
tempered its operation,
110
 priority still has immediate and expensive 
consequences.  Senior water right owners can depend on it, especially where 
state law extends the doctrine to hydrologically connected groundwater.  In 
Colorado, surface water rights owners have secured the curtailment of junior 
alluvial groundwater rights,
111
 despite sophisticated legal mechanisms such 
                                                          
 105.  Id. § 82a-706. 
 106.  Id. §§ 82a-711(a), -708b. 
 107.  See, e.g., Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962) (holding that the KWAA 
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. 
Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981) (holding that the KWAA was a valid use of the state’s police 
powers to regulate water consumption).  
 108.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 44.  
 109.  See Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v 
(1991) (announcing the death of the prior appropriation doctrine).  Justice Gregory J. Hobbs of the 
Colorado Supreme Court vehemently disagreed with Wilkinson’s announcement of the death of the 
doctrine.  See Gregory J. Hobbs, Ecological Integrity, New Western Myth: A Critique of the Long’s 
Peak Report, 24 ENVTL. L. 157 (1994); see also Gregory J. Hobbs, Priority: The Most 
Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 50–55 (2002).  For a discussion of the vitality 
of the prior appropriation doctrine across the West, see A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, 
Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or 
Rhetoric?]; A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 769 (2001) [hereinafter Tarlock, Future of Prior Appropriation]. 
 110.  See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws 
and Local Decisions Eclipsed the State’s Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2001).  It is worth noting 
that the late Professor Getches published this article on the eve of the events described infra note 
111. 
 111.  A prominent recent example is from Colorado.  In the wake of the severe drought of 2002–
03 and the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 
2003), nearly 4,000 junior groundwater pumpers in the South Platte River Basin, some with 
priorities dating back to the 1950s, were curtailed, with substantial economic consequences.  
Gregory J. Hobbs, Protecting Prior Appropriation Water Rights Through Integrating Tributary 
Groundwater, Colorado’s Experience, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Hobbs, Protecting 
Prior Appropriation Water Rights].  See also Gregory J. Hobbs, Reviving the Public Ownership, 
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as substitute supply and augmentation plans, which are designed to enable 
junior groundwater rights to operate even in times of drought.
112
  In Kansas, 
senior surface water rights owners have secured priority protections through 
both straight priority calls and through Intensive Groundwater Use Control 




The classical western water right—the right established within these 
assumptions of hydrologically connected surface and groundwater—has 
survived into the twenty-first century because the imperatives that produced 
it in the first place remain, and have become even more pressing.  The 
physical imperative remains, and will intensify as global warming reduces 
western water supplies through higher temperatures during irrigation 
season.
114
  The legal imperative to protect and to rely upon the water right 
owner’s investment in a private property interest quite obviously remains, as 
water rights become more valuable.  The intensity of the West’s recent 
droughts have underlined the regulatory imperative, and the growing 
importance of water as a public and environmental resource has produced 
amendments to western law codes that underline the public imperative.
115
 
The classical western water right remains a credible property interest for 
                                                          
Antispeculation, and Beneficial Use Moorings of Prior Appropriation Water Law, 84 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 97, 114–21 (discussing the consequences of Empire Lodge Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Moyer, 39 
P.3d 1139 (Colo., 2001)).  For a survey of South Platte water administration since Empire Lodge, see 
generally P. Andrew Jones, South Platte Well Crisis, 2002-2010: Evolving Alluvial Groundwater 
Regulation, 78 THE WATER REPORT 1 (2010). 
 112.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(2) & 37-92-305(5), (10) (2013).  
 113.  IN THE MATTER OF THE DESIGNATION OF AN INTENSIVE GROUNDWATER USE CONTROL 
AREA IN BARTON, RUSH AND NESS COUNTIES, KANSAS 102–03, ¶¶ 23–24 (Jan. 29, 1992), available 
at http://www.ksda.ks.gov/docs/default-source/igucas/wc1992.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (Order of the Chief 
Engineer, Kansas Division of Water Resources, allocating water in the Walnut Creek Intensive 
Groundwater Use Area according to a cutoff priority date of Oct. 1, 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-
1038(b)(2) (2013) (requiring the chief engineer, Division of Water Resources, to follow priority 
dates of water rights “insofar as may be reasonably done”). 
 114.  The United States Geological Survey forecasts an increase in annual mean maximum 
temperature of 3.6 degrees Celsius for the State of Kansas and 3.7 degrees of the States of Colorado 
and Nebraska, based on a comparison of the historical average of years 1980–2004 and a modeled 
forecast average of years 2050–74.  See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CLIMATE AND LAND 
USE CHANGE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, available at 
http://www.usgs.gov/climate_landuse/clu_rd/nex-dcp30.asp. See also HIGH PLAINS REGIONAL 
CLIMATE CENTER (LINCOLN, NEBRASKA), CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE PRAIRIE: A BASIC GUIDE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE HIGH PLAINS REGION—UPDATE  (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.hprcc.unl.edu/publications/files/HighPlainsClimateChangeGuide-2013.pdf; Johannes 
Feddema & Nathaniel Brunsell (Department of Geography, University of Kansas), Kansas and 
Climate Change, available at http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/conferen/kepc07/Feddema_KEPC.pdf. 
 115.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a to -703c. (2013) (establishing minimum desirable 
streamflows). 
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another reason: its legal and administrative claims correspond fairly well 
with what its owner can rely upon.  In wet years, the owner can rely upon 
receiving the full supply of water to which he is entitled.  The owner knows 
his relative priority in his water rights neighborhood, and so in times of 
water shortage and drought, he can estimate the relationship between that 
shortage and the amount of water he will likely receive.  Because that supply 





 levels, the owner can make informed cropping 
decisions in advance of irrigation season, based on annual forecasts.  The 
owner also knows how drought affects his regulatory situation.  Just as he 
can be expected to place a call on the river if diversions by juniors threaten 
to impair his senior right, he can rely on owners of rights senior to him to do 
the same, or threaten to do so, and such threats have real consequences.  In 
either case, he can rely upon a call for administration to actually result in 
administration.
118
  And because of the hydrology of a water rights 
neighborhood of surface and alluvial groundwater rights, he can rely upon 
that administration to produce wet water in the stream.  The classical 
western water right answers to hydrological reality and to administrative 
practice, and it works reliably.  Finally—and this is not a trivial point—its 
owner can credibly hope that the drought will end. 
II. THE GROUNDWATER REVOLUTION AND THE GROUNDWATER RIGHT 
Yet for all of these virtues of the classical water right, it did not do what 
it could not do: it did not anticipate the groundwater revolution that began 
during the 1950s.  Across the Great Plains, legislatures and courts 
considered the hydrologic connection between groundwater and surface 
streams, but they retained the assumption that the system as a whole was 
                                                          
 116.  See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
CONSERVATION SERVICE, NATIONAL WATER AND CLIMATE CENTER, SNOTEL DATA AND 
PRODUCTS, available at http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/snow/ (providing snowpack and snow 
moisture content data for the western mountain states); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLORADO REGION, RIVER BASIN SNOWPACK 
CONDITIONS, available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/notice/snowpack.html (showing the snow 
water equivalent of sub-basins within the Upper Colorado River Basin).   
 117.  See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
SNOWPACK & RESERVOIR LEVELS, GREAT PLAINS REGION, available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/gp/hydromet/curres_google.htm?lat=38.4879&lng=-98.4396&zoom=7 
(scalable map showing real-time reservoir levels across the Great Plains region). 
 118.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706b (2013) (providing “[u]pon making a determination 
of an unlawful diversion the chief engineer . . . shall direct that the headgates, valves, or other 
controlling works . . . be opened, closed, adjusted, or regulated as may be necessary to secure water 
to the person having the prior right to its use”). 
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replenished on a regular basis by rainfall.
119
  The largest supply of water in 
the region, the huge but effectively non-renewable supplies of the Ogallala, 
did not figure into their considerations.  Over the next several decades, it 
turned the legal world of water upside down. 
To understand why, consider the physical situation.  The climate is the 
same, if not slightly warmer and more arid than it was in the nineteenth 
century.  But wherever irrigable land is located over the Ogallala, the fact of 
climatic aridity does not impose the sentence of dry land farming: water can 
be obtained from beneath the farm itself, with no need for further diversion 
and transportation.  The history of western water law would be 
fundamentally different, and the ambit of its peculiar doctrines substantially 
limited, had the Forty-Niners mined the Central Valley instead of the Sierra 
Nevada, or the Fifty-Niners the Great Plains instead of the Rockies.
120
  And 
in contrast to the annual variability of the West’s river systems, the Ogallala 
exists almost entirely in geological time.  The deposition of the Ogallala 
Formation began ten to twelve million years ago, as clays, silt, sands, and 
gravels washed off of the Rocky Mountains; most of the water in the aquifer 
came later, from retreating glaciers and streams during the last ice age.  
Annual recharge of water into the aquifer from precipitation is low, ranging 
from less than one inch at the aquifer’s western edge to six inches at its 
eastern portion, the Equus Beds sub-aquifer.
121
  As a result, the waters of the 
Ogallala are mostly unconfined, and do not vary in supply as surface 
systems do; as they decline from excessive groundwater pumping, they 
decline in a mostly linear fashion over the long term.
122
  There is also less 
variability in place.  Where the surface water systems of the West (and its 
major irrigation districts) are concentrated in river valleys, the Ogallala 
Aquifer, while locally variable in depth and in saturated thickness, is 
diffused, if not uniformly so, across the Great Plains.
123
  In short, the 
Ogallala provided irrigators with a fundamentally different water situation 
than that which confronted their nineteenth century forebears.  It provided 
                                                          
 119.  See, e.g., 1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 11–16, 17. 
 120.  HAWORTH, supra note 23, at 46–47. 
 121.  REX C. BUCHANAN, ROBERT R. BUDDEMEIER, & B. BROWNIE WILSON, LAWRENCE, 
KANSAS: KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PUBLIC INFORMATION CIRCULAR 18, THE HIGH PLAINS 
AQUIFER (2009).  
 122.  See, e.g., J. J. Butler et al., High Plains Aquifer Index Well Program: 2012 Annual Report, 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS: KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN-FILE REPORT NO. 2013-1 at 43, Figure 
20 (Mar. 2013) (showing mean annual water-level change in the High Plains Aquifer in the three 
groundwater management districts of western Kansas between 1996 and 2012, with linear regression 
for the data).  
 123.  BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 121, at 3, Figure 4. 
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them with a large, stable, and easily accessible water supply, one that needed 
neither diversion works nor reservoirs.  The water was right where it was 
needed, readily available in both wet years and drought years. 
The distinctive characteristics of Ogallala groundwater as a resource—
its size, dependability, location, and hydrology—prompted the question of 
whether to retain established limits that governed the development of new 
water rights.  Starting in the late 1950s, state legislatures amended their 
water codes to exploit the Ogallala, but without setting a limit on its 
depletion.  The opportunity to irrigate above the Ogallala was too good to 
restrict within a legal regime predicated upon the assumptions of the 
classical western water right.  The problems of depletion, if they arose, could 
be put off for later.  As a result, the groundwater revolution fundamentally 
redefined the most important water right across the Great Plains—the right 
to the effectively non-renewable waters of the Ogallala. 
Kansas confronted the groundwater revolution from a strong statutory 
position.  Under the original 1945 KWAA, prior appropriation applied with 
identical force across groundwater rights as it did across surface rights, in 
obedience to the recommendations of experts such as Hutchins.  As a 
consequence, if the operation of a junior groundwater right in any way 
affected a senior right, then the application for that junior groundwater right 
would be denied.
124
  Such a principle protected the maintenance of 
groundwater levels upon which existing rights relied; it did not countenance 
depletion. 
Yet the doctrinal purity and regulatory strictness of this approach lasted 
little more than a decade. Kansas policy makers recognized that any 
significant development of the Ogallala would inevitably lower water levels, 
making impairment of senior rights under the strict prior appropriation 
doctrine of the KWAA “merely a matter of time . . . .”
125
  The intolerant 
approach to depletion set forth in the 1945 KWAA would effectively 
prohibit subsequent development of the Ogallala.  So it was decided that the 
sure prospect of economic growth justified a compromise in the protections 
afforded to prior appropriators, a compromise that redefined impairment 
according to economics first and hydrology second.  The Kansas Legislature 
in 1957 redefined impairment as impairment “beyond a reasonable economic 
                                                          
 124.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (Kan. L. 1945, ch. 390, § 11) (1945) required the chief 
engineer to reject a water rights application if “the water sought to be appropriated would impair 
vested rights, prior appropriations, or be detrimental to the public interest.” 
 125.  KANSAS WATER RESOURCES BOARD, REPORT ON THE LAWS OF KANSAS PERTAINING TO 
THE BENEFICIAL USE OF WATER 91 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 REPORT]. 
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limit.”
126
  Junior rights could legally impair prior rights from a hydrological 
perspective (by lowering the water table), but not from an economic one (by 
lowering the water table below a reasonable economic limit).  Even as it 
reduced the level of protection to which a senior right was entitled, the 
legislature enhanced the legal status of a water right itself, by explicitly 
redefining it in statute as a real property right
127




These amendments were intended to clarify the KWAA rather than to 
substantively modify it,
129
 but together with the groundwater revolution, 
they produced a legal paradox.  For as water rights tapped into the non-
renewable, impermanent supplies of the Ogallala, their legal status as 
permanent, real property rights was explicitly stated.
130
  The KWAA’s 1957 
redefinition of impairment, together with a liberal policy of granting water 
rights applications, substantially enabled the over-appropriation of 
groundwater in Kansas.
131
  DWR did not assess the long-term availability of 
the water supply in evaluating new groundwater applications, and the 
amount of water authorized under new applications eventually defaulted to 
the irrigation requirements of the appurtenant land.
132
  It has been asserted 
that the KWAA’s express definition of water rights as real property rights 
“thereby protect[s] them against ‘takings’ by the government,” and that this 
definition has “acted as a deterrent to retroactive restrictions of water right 
pumping.”
133
  While experts differ concerning the first assertion,
134
 the 
belief in the heightened status of water rights as property rights is a common 
                                                          
 126.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (Kan. L. 1957, ch 539, § 16) (1957).  
 127.  1957 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 539, § 1 (now found at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (Supp. 
2012)). 
 128.  1957 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 539, § 7 (now found at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-705 (Supp. 
2012)). 
 129.  1956 REPORT, supra note 125, at 76. 
 130.  John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater—Some Lessons from the Kansas 
Experience, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 496–98 (2003). 
 131.  Water rights applications under the 1945 KWAA numbered just 334 between 1945 and 
1950.  By contrast, DWR recorded 5,730 applications during the 1950s, 6,433 during the 1960s, and 
16,226 in the 1970s, mostly for irrigation rights from the Ogallala Aquifer.  John C. Peck, 
Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
441, 443 (2006). 
 132.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-5-12 (1994) (net irrigation requirements by county); id. § 5-24-
2(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2004) (net irrigation requirements for corn as the baseline for calculating available 
water supply). 
 133.  Peck, supra note 131, at 460. 
 134.  See, e.g., Sax, supra note 58, at 260 (“The constitutional law of water [rights] is the same 
as the constitutional law of potatoes and pork chops.”). 
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one, and that belief has indeed deterred restrictions.
135
  As depletion set in 
during the late 1960s and 1970s, water rights owners who had obtained their 
rights without an evaluation of a sustainable water supply were nonetheless 
legally entitled to defend those rights as real property rights predicated upon 
such a supply.  In the parlance of Professor Carol Rose, Kansas began with a 
crystalline water code in 1945; just twelve years later, the groundwater 
revolution spattered it with mud.
136
 
By contrast, Colorado began with mud, and responded to the 
groundwater revolution by forming clearly distinct crystals.  Between the 
1940s and the 1960s, Colorado struggled to achieve legal clarity as 
groundwater development expanded across the Ogallala in the eastern part 
of the state.  The 1943 Adjudication Act did not address groundwater,
137
  but 
in 1951 the Colorado Supreme Court established a presumption that all 
groundwater was tributary to its watershed and subject to appropriation 
accordingly.
138
  The Colorado Ground Water Law of 1957 attempted to 
address groundwater depletion across the non-tributary groundwater supplies 
of the Ogallala by establishing a Ground Water Commission, and by 
requiring wells in that part of the state to be registered with and permitted by 
the state engineer.
139
  However, the Colorado Supreme Court later ruled that 
the state engineer lacked the authority both to adjudicate and to administer 
rights to non-tributary groundwater.
140
  By the early 1960s, the law for 
tributary groundwater and the law for non-tributary, Ogallala groundwater 
had diverged in Colorado.
141
 
Colorado’s response to this divergence was to make a fundamental 
statutory distinction between its two principal sources of groundwater.  
Rather than placing all of the state’s water within the same statutory 
regime—as Kansas had in 1945, and then adjusted for the Ogallala in 
                                                          
 135.  Sax, supra note 58, at 260 n.5 (citing a letter from Professor Lawrence J. MacDonnell). 
 136.  See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 
577–610 (1988). 
 137.  Adjudication Act of 1943, ch. 190, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613 (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 148-9-1 to -27 (1963), repealed by The Water Right Determination and Administration Act  
of 1969, ch. 373, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1223).  See Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Colorado 
Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1997). 
 138.  Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).  
 139.  See Act of of May 1, 1957, ch. 289, §§ 3, 5, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 863-863-69.  See 
Gregory J. Hobbs, Colorado’s 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act: Settling In, 3 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1999).  
 140.  Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131, 139 (Colo. 1963).  
 141.  In contrast to Whitten v. Coit, supra, see City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 
555 (Colo. 1961) (asserting judicial responsibility over tributary groundwater).  The same subject is 
discussed in Hobbs, supra note 139, at 12–13. 
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1957—Colorado established distinct categories of groundwater instead.  
First, there is “tributary groundwater,” which is defined as groundwater that 
has a significant hydrologic connection to a natural surface stream—
predominantly, the groundwater that lies within the alluvial aquifers of 
Colorado’s rivers.  Due to this close hydrological connection, the pumping 
of tributary groundwater has a relatively rapid impact on surface flows and 
thus on surface water rights.  Under the Water Rights Determination and 
Administration Act of 1969, Colorado decided that these tributary 
groundwater supplies should be governed according to the same doctrine of 
prior appropriation that had governed surface water rights since statehood.
142
  
“With the advent of conjunctive use of tributary groundwater and surface 
water, the maximum utilization of the waters of the state, through vested 
rights, was heralded as Colorado’s constitutional water law doctrine.”
143
  As 
a consequence, those who seek to obtain a water right in tributary 
groundwater must pursue the same procedures as obtaining a right to surface 
water—by obtaining a decree through one of Colorado’s seven water courts, 
whose jurisdiction applies to the state’s seven principal watersheds.
144
 
The other major type of groundwater in Colorado was labeled 
“designated groundwater”—a category defined according to both 
hydrological and historical conditions.
145
  The hydrological condition locates 
designated groundwater in alluvial aquifers that do not underlie a flowing 
stream, and in the unconfined and semi-confined aquifers on Colorado’s 
Eastern High Plains—the waters of the Ogallala.  As a result of this 
hydrological situation, the withdrawal of such water does not have the rapid 
impact on surface flows and surface water rights that occur with the 
pumping of tributary groundwater.  The historical condition concerns the 
extent of water rights development in the area: designated groundwater was 
either groundwater that would not supply pre-existing, decreed surface 
rights, or groundwater that was not adjacent to alluvial (and therefore 
tributary) groundwater supplies upon which tributary groundwater rights had 
                                                          
 142.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 (2014). 
 143.  Hobbs, supra note 139, at 21 (citing Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994–95 (Colo. 
1968)). 
 144.  A successful applicant for a right to tributary groundwater obtains a decree to that right 
after going through a civil court case in which the water court resolves claims brought by protestants 
to the application, who usually claim that the new water right will impair their prior rights.  Once 
obtained, a water right to tributary groundwater receives the same protections as surface water rights 
receive—namely, the administration of water rights in priority, as performed by the state engineer. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (2014). 
 145.  1965 Ground Water Management Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-103(6)(a) (2014).   
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depended for at least fifteen years.
146
  Where the aquifer’s connection to 
surface water systems was attenuated, but where it constituted the principal 




Because little groundwater development had taken place across 
Colorado’s portion of the Ogallala before the 1950s, this definition 
effectively enabled those groundwater supplies to be defined as designated 
groundwater.  Colorado applied a modified doctrine of prior appropriation to 
designated groundwater, protecting prior appropriations of groundwater at 
“reasonable groundwater pumping levels,” but not absolutely; the law would 
not secure the “maintenance of historical water levels.”
148
  In establishing 
this category of groundwater, Colorado, like Kansas in 1957, recognized that 
the development of groundwater across the Ogallala could not take place 
without compromising the doctrine of prior appropriation and condoning 
depletion.  That compromise carried a notable nominal cost: the right to 
pump designated groundwater does not qualify as a “water right” under 
Colorado law, but is instead a “well permit.”
149
 
As for Nebraska, it did not make any substantial adjustments to its water 
law in the immediate wake of the groundwater revolution.  Although it had 
enshrined the doctrine of prior appropriation in its state constitution, 
Nebraska never extended that doctrine to groundwater, which is governed 
instead by the doctrine of correlative rights.
150
  The doctrinal gap between 
surface and groundwater in Nebraska is a longstanding one, and is largely a 
matter of design.
151
  Subsequent statutes have explicitly recognized the fact 
of hydrologically connected groundwater and surface water supplies.
152
  Yet 
despite this acknowledgment, the Nebraska Supreme Court has not protected 




                                                          
 146.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (2014). 
 147.  Hobbs, supra note 139, at 21 (citing Colorado Ground Water Comm’n v. Eagle Peak 
Farms, Ltd., 919 P.2d 212, 215 (Colo. 1996); Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 756 (Colo. 
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 148.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (2014). 
 149.  Id. §§ 37-90-107, 37-90-108.  
 150.  Osterman et al. v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 268 N.W. 334 (1936); In re Metro. 
Util. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (1966).  
 151.  “As to ground water, practically speaking, we do not have any law.  There is no question 
but what in the future something will have to be done about that, probably the sooner the better.”  
Conference Transcript, supra note 79, at 95 (comments of Mr. John Riddell, Assistant Attorney 
General for Nebraska).  
 152.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-703(1)–(4) (2013). 
 153.  Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005); In re Complaint of Cent. Neb. Pub. 
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Across Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, the groundwater revolution 
produced a significant expansion in the practical property right to pump 
groundwater.  Kansas law removed the strict definitional constraints of what 
constituted impairment.  Colorado placed its Ogallala water resources under 
a regime of “modified” prior appropriation, and excepted them from the 
procedural and administrative burdens attached to decreed Colorado water 
rights.  As for Nebraska, it maintained its correlative rights regime for 
groundwater, which enabled the development of, and subsequent reliance 
upon, groundwater pumping beyond the domain of central state regulation 
under the priority system.  This expansion helped to establish the dominance 
of groundwater irrigation, and it produced in turn a contraction of the legal 
means by which senior water rights could challenge new groundwater 
development.  The groundwater revolution transformed the classical western 
right into a substantially different property right, largely in response to the 
characteristics of the Ogallala itself. 
The groundwater revolution also produced important changes in how 
Ogallala water rights and well permits were regulated.  Across these distinct 
regulatory regimes, the groundwater revolution produced something that is 
perhaps more important, and something that may determine the future of the 
Ogallala itself: it produced its own type of public. 
While Kansas modified its water law in 1957 in response to the 
groundwater revolution, it retained centralized authority over all types of 
groundwater; yet in response to the distinctive characteristics of the 
Ogallala, Kansas created local groundwater districts.  After a false start in 
1968,
154
  Kansas enacted the Groundwater Management District Act (GMD 
Act) in 1972.
155
  The GMD Act expressly sought to establish a degree of 
local involvement (in partnership with DWR) with the regulation of 
groundwater rights over the Ogallala, and in this regard the GMD Act has 
largely succeeded.
156
  Five GMDs were formed in western Kansas.
157
  
Endowed with the power to assess taxes within their boundaries,
158
 and with 
                                                          
Power, 699 N.W.2d 372 (2005); Cent. Neb. Pub. Power and Irr. Dist. v. N. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 
788 N.W.2d 252 (2011). 
 154.  1968 Kan. Sess. Laws 1537–39 (previously codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1001 to -
1019; repealed 1972).  
 155.  1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 827–35,  (now codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (1997 & 
Supp. 2011)).  For a fuller treatment of the GMD Act, which has been regularly amended since 
1972, see John C. Peck, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 51 (1980); 
Peck, supra note 131. 
 156.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (2013). 
 157.  See Peck, supra note 131, at 444. 
 158.  KAN. STAT. ANN.§  82a-1028(h) (2013). 
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a voting membership limited to holders of groundwater rights,
159
 the GMDs 
have become the most powerful force in Kansas water politics. 
Yet the intractable problem of over-appropriation remains.  Pursuant to 
the GMD Act, the GMDs and DWR have closed large areas to new water 
rights, and have adopted-specific regulations such as yield and depletion 
formulae for new water rights applications.
160
  Yet these actions, while 
significant, have largely avoided confronting the difficult challenge of 
reconciling the rules of prior appropriation with the reality of the Ogallala’s 
permanent depletion.  Indeed, in Southwest Kansas Groundwater 
Management District No. 3, the state has deferred to local irrigators by 
adopting a policy that condones further depletion.  For new water rights and 
changes to existing water rights, GMD No. 3 and DWR will accept the effect 
of a depletion of forty percent or more of the local area of the aquifer over a 
twenty-five period.
161
  Despite its initial and perceived intent to limit 
excessive groundwater development, this formula has instead become “an 




Kansas law has long contained a tool to confront the problem of over-
appropriation, a tool devised at the local level.  In 1978, the GMD Act was 
amended to allow for the establishment of IGUCAs.
163
  The IGUCA statutes 
originated from local initiative, taken at a time when DWR was less 
concerned with the problem of groundwater depletion than the GMDs 
were.
164
  Under the IGUCA statutes, a GMD, local irrigators, or the chief 
engineer may initiate the establishment of such an area to address 
groundwater depletion, including situations where excessive groundwater 
pumping has reduced streamflows upon which surface water rights 
depend.
165
  To address such problems, the IGUCA statutes enable the chief 
engineer to reduce the authorized quantities of groundwater rights within an 
IGUCA—even where such a reduction does not strictly follow prior 
                                                          
 159.  Id. § 82a-1021(a)(5) (2013). 
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appropriation.
166
  The tools afforded the chief engineer are powerful ones.  
Yet while eight IGUCAs have been established across western Kansas, none 
have been established over the Ogallala.
167
 
The power of the GMDs and the conspicuous absence of an IGUCA 
over the Ogallala reveal one of the most politically important consequences 
of the groundwater revolution in western Kansas: a divergence between the 
long-accepted notion of the public as a statewide whole, and the more recent 
notion of local groundwater publics.  Both notions are real, but Kansas water 
law is confused about this divergence.  The GMD Act seeks to “establish the 
right of local water users to determine their destiny with respect to the use of 
groundwater,” yet at the same time it also seeks to “preserve basic water use 
doctrine”
168
—namely, that of prior appropriation, enforced centrally by the 
chief engineer.
169
  The GMD Act established five powerful political bodies 
in western Kansas, granting them a degree of local autonomy over 
groundwater management, while at the same time endowing the chief 
engineer with explicit powers to impose substantial reductions in 
groundwater use within those very districts through the IGUCA statutes.  
This divergence has created a tense situation across western Kansas.  
Irrigators who genuinely want to address the problem of the Ogallala’s 
depletion may be willing to accept reductions in groundwater pumping, but 
they are clearly not willing to risk an IGUCA that imposes reductions which 
exceed their expectations.
170
  In the opinion of Ogallala irrigators, the 
IGUCA is too powerful a tool to risk using.
171
 
A recent innovation in Kansas water law offers hope to bridge this 
divide between DWR’s central regulatory authority and the local GMD’s.  In 
2012, the Kansas Legislature enacted a statute allowing for the creation of 
Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs).
172
  The statute allows GMDs 
to address groundwater declines through locally-generated management 
                                                          
 166.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1038 (2013). 
 167.  For a summary of Kansas IGUCAs, see Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas 
(IGUCAs), KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-
kansas-water-resources/intensive-groundwater-use-control-areas (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
 168.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1020 (2013). 
 169.  Id. § 82a-706 (2013).  Professor Peck was the first to recognize this contradiction. Peck, 
supra note 131, at 445.  
 170.  KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, ORDER OF 
DESIGNATION APPROVING THE SHERIDAN 6 LOCAL ENHANCED MANAGEMENT AREA WITHIN 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT NO. 4, at 2 (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://dwr.kda.ks.gov/LEMAs/SD6/LEMA.SD6.OrderOfDesignation.20130417.pdf [hereinafter 
LEMA Order]. 
 171.  See, e.g., id. at 8 (comments of Mr. Mitchell Baalman). 
 172.  2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 382–85 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041). 
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plans that include specific goals and corrective control provisions—usually, 
reductions in groundwater pumping.  This local autonomy over both the 
management initiative and the management plan distinguishes LEMAs from 
IGUCAs.  Unlike the more open-ended IGUCA process, which allows the 
chief engineer to initiate IGUCA proceedings independently of a GMD and 
allows substantial leeway to consider various goals and corrective control 
provisions,
173
 LEMA proceedings can only be initiated by the GMD, and the 
subject of the proceedings is limited to the GMD’s management plan—two 
important differences, both substantively and procedurally.
174
  In the event 
the chief engineer approves the local management plan, he issues a final 
“Order of Designation” setting forth that plan; and the chief engineer, not the 
GMD, enforces its terms.
175
  The LEMA statute thus achieves a compromise 
between local control over a groundwater management plan—provided that 
plan provides for meaningful reductions in pumping—and central control 
over review and enforcement of the plan. 
In 2013, DWR and Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4 cooperated in the 
formation of the first LEMA in Kansas, the Sheridan County 6 LEMA, 
which is located within the boundaries of Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4.
176
  
This LEMA imposed a twenty percent reduction in groundwater pumping 
for five years
177
 across nearly 100 square miles in Sheridan and Thomas 
Counties.
178
  Tellingly, the LEMA Order gives no respect to priority: all 
irrigation rights receive the same reduction.
179
  Both the LEMA statute and 




Colorado’s statutory redefinitions of Ogallala groundwater during the 
1960s also had important regulatory and public consequences.  The 1965 
Ground Water Management Act not only redefined most of the waters of the 
Colorado High Plains, but also changed the law to defer to local 
                                                          
 173.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036, 82a-1038(b). 
 174.  Id. §§ 82a-1041(a), 82a-1041(c). 
 175.  Id. § 82a-1041(f). 
 176.  See generally, Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs), KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC, DIV. 
OF WATER RESOURCES, http://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-
resources/local-enhanced-management-areas/lists/lemas/sheridan-county-6-lema (last visited Apr. 5, 
2014). 
 177.  LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 22–23.   
 178.  Id. at 28–29. 
 179.  Id. at 17–18 (“By contrast, the Proposal reduces all non-domestic water rights of the same 
use made of water by the same amount, regardless of priority.”). 
 180.  See, e.g., Sip It Slowly: Farmers in Kansas Are Starting to Adapt to Declining Stocks of 
Groundwater, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21586874-farmers-kansas-are-starting-adapt-declining-stocks-groundwater-sip-it-slowly. 
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groundwater management districts, giving them the power to make 
important decisions regarding the use and conservation of water.  Under the 
1965 Act, Colorado decentralized the appropriation and administration of 
designated groundwater to three related entities: the Colorado Ground Water 
Commission, the state engineer, and local groundwater management 
districts.
181
  The commission, whose executive director is the state engineer, 
issues well permits for the designated basin.  The commission is essentially a 
political body: of its ten voting members, six must be “resident agriculturists 
of designated ground water basins.”
182
  The Act thus intends to achieve a 
balance of enforcement power, to be shared by a technical expert in water 
rights (the state engineer and his staff), a politically-appointed, statewide 
body (the commission), and the local groundwater district, which, like its 
Kansas counterpart, is dominated by irrigators.  The district usually relies 
upon the state engineer and the commission in enforcing the terms of well 
permits in the basin, but it does have independent enforcement authority.
183
  
More importantly, the district has the power to regulate pumping to reduce 
the lowering of the water table through its right to “exercise . . . 
administrative and regulatory authority concerning the ground waters of the 
district” (except for the processing of well permit applications).
184
  And in 
the event that a well owner in a designated basin places a priority call 
against other well owners in his water rights neighborhood, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has ruled that neither the commission nor the state engineer 
has the power to administer the relevant rights; instead, the local 
groundwater management district alone must take action.
185
  Although direct 
priority was typically the province of the state engineer, Colorado decided 
that local bodies are more effective at making those decisions than a state 
body (in this case, the commission) or the state engineer.  This contrasts with 




Colorado’s statutory distinction between tributary and designated 
groundwater is more than a hydrological distinction: it excised much of the 
Ogallala in Colorado from the public itself.  Before the groundwater 
                                                          
 181.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-101 to -143 (2001).  
 182.  Id. § 37-90-104(3)(b). 
 183.  Id. § 37-90-111.5(1)(a) (referring to district’s right to seek an injunction and civil 
penalties). 
 184.  Id. §§ 37-90-130(2)(a), (j). 
 185.  Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1186 
(Colo. 2000). 
 186.  See supra text accompanying notes 142–44. 
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revolution, Colorado law could have been construed to include groundwater 
as a public resource.  The Colorado Constitution states that “[t]he water of  
every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be 
the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people 
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.”
187
  It also 
establishes the “right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural 
stream to beneficial uses” according to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
188
  
Finally, Colorado’s adjudication statutes, first enacted in 1879, provided the 
means to enforce and implement this right to appropriate previously 
unappropriated “water in the natural stream or streams.”
189
  All groundwater 
in Colorado is connected to the “waters of the stream”;
190
 the connection is a 
matter of degree.  Conceivably then, all groundwater is part of the waters of 
the state.  However, these statutes did not resolve the question of whether 
groundwater was a public resource; on the contrary, they became 
anachronistic and troublesome, and threatened to force every groundwater 
pumper to obtain a water court decree.
191
  Yet the fact that the constitutional 
provisions referred to “natural streams” provided a legal exclusion for 
groundwater supplies (such as those occurring in the deeper Ogallala and 
Dakota formations) that were distant from live streams.  Faced with this 
choice, Colorado reclassified most of its Ogallala groundwater supplies apart 
from the public domain, by limiting “waters of the state” to surface and 
groundwater that was tributary to the natural streams of Colorado.
192
  
Groundwater that was tributary to surface water supplies was within the 
constitutional domain of public water available for prior appropriation, while 
non-tributary groundwater was not.
193
  While implicit, such clarity is 
nonetheless notable, and it raises a remarkable question: can a local 
groundwater management district effectively dictate what is in the best 
                                                          
 187.  COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.  
 188.  Id. § 6. 
 189.  1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94–108; Adjudication Act of 1881, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142.  
The 1903 adjudication statute did not change in this regard.  Adjudication Act of 1903, 1903 Colo. 
Sess. Laws at 297 (referring to “water rights derived from any natural stream, water-course, or any 
other source . . .”).  The 1943 Adjudication Act was silent regarding groundwater.  See supra note 
137.  For a longer treatment of the Colorado adjudication acts, see Hobbs, supra note 137, at 9–10. 
 190.  Safranek v. Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).  
 191.  GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW, at § 3.5 (1987). 
 192.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (2001).  
 193.  Id. § 37-82-101(1).  Another category of groundwater—“not nontributary ground water”—
describes the stacked aquifers within the Denver Basin, which supply water to the newer 
communities along the suburban Front Range.  Due to their high economic value as municipal water 
sources, the Colorado General Assembly did not apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to them; 
ownership of these resources is connected to the overlying land, and assumes a 100-year depletion 
period.  Id. § 37-90-102(2).  
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interests of the State as a whole?  Recent litigation suggests how local 
groundwater management districts in Colorado can exert a decisive 
influence in statewide decisions.
194
 
Because Nebraska has never claimed central authority over the 
regulation of groundwater, it has never had to delegate that authority.  Thus, 
Nebraska’s legal reaction to the groundwater revolution has largely been to 
continue its longstanding state of divided governance.  Surface water and 
water rights are administered by the Nebraska Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR).
195
  Groundwater is governed by a different set of laws 
and administered by Natural Resource Districts (NRDs), which usually 
comprise several counties and are distinct political subdivisions of the 
state.
196
  In making this distinction, the Nebraska Legislature made the 
express finding that groundwater is a matter for local control, stating “local 
entities are the preferred regulators of activities which may contribute to 
ground water depletion.”
197
  The growth in groundwater irrigation in 
Nebraska has brought with it a commensurate increase in the power of the 
NRDs.  Each NRD has its own taxing authority, its board members are 
popularly elected, and its authority is limited to a discrete geographic area.
198
  
With certain complex exceptions that relate to interstate rivers,
199
  NRDs 
control the granting, administration, and regulation of groundwater permits 
in Nebraska, and even when the DNR is involved in the management of 
groundwater, such involvement is dependent on the local NRD approval 
through rules and regulations.
200
  Because of this bifurcated approach, 
Nebraska “has not developed an appropriation system that addresses direct 
                                                          
 194.   See, e.g., In re: Non-Binding Arbitration Pursuant to the Final Settlement Stipulation, 
Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, No. 126 Original, U.S. Supreme Court, before Martha O. Pagel, 
Arbitrator, Arbitrator’s Decision on Colorado Compact Compliance Pipeline Dispute, November 27, 
2013, at 6 (describing an interstate augmentation pipeline pumping Ogallala groundwater from 
beneath the Sand Hills Groundwater Management District, water necessary to achieve the State of 
Colorado’s compliance with the Republican River Compact, and operated by the Republican River 
Water Conservation District).  
 195.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206(1) (2009) (“The Department of Natural Resources is given 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to water rights for irrigation, power, or other useful purposes 
except as such jurisdiction is specifically limited by statute.”). 
 196.  See id. § 2-3213(1) (describing NRDs). 
 197.  Id. § 46-702. 
 198.  See generally id. §§ 2-3201 to -32,115. 
 199.  Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126 Orig., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 123 (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/special_master/files/2013-11-15_511.pdf (noting that “Nebraska’s 
statutory law is complex, and contains no express statement that the DNR may order groundwater 
pumping curtailments”). 
 200.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-715(1) (NRDs jointly develop integrated management plans with 
DNR).  This is the opposite of the Kansas system, where local GMD rules and regulations must be 
approved by the chief engineer to become effective.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1028(o) (2013). 
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conflicts between users of surface water and ground water that is 
hydrologically connected.”
201
  Because groundwater irrigation dominates in 
Nebraska, the managers of the NRDs collectively exert considerably more 
influence over irrigation than the Director of the DNR, whose jurisdiction is 
limited to surface waters, and who lacks independent authority “to regulate 




III. DROUGHT, DEPLETION, AND THE MODERN GROUNDWATER RIGHT IN 
PRACTICE 
State law has established the modern groundwater right, and it has 
defined and described its attributes, its entitlements, and its boundaries.  
Pursuant to the state’s police power, state legislatures have conferred upon 
state agencies certain duties to grant, regulate, and administer that right.  Yet 
while legal definitions, descriptions, and procedures may set the legal 
boundaries of a client’s conduct, they cannot begin to capture the way in 
which the client actually behaves, even when the client stays within those 
boundaries.  Too fixed a focus “on the formal law ignores the significant 
changes in its function.”
203
  To understand how irrigators across the Ogallala 
are responding to its permanent depletion, it is necessary to understand the 
functional differences between such depletion and a typical drought.  While 
drought and groundwater depletion both create water shortages, they are 
distinct problems that affect the administration and operation of water rights 
in significantly different ways.  Water law experts recognized this difference 
at the outset of the groundwater revolution,
204
 but the difference has itself 
changed, and it has become more urgent. 
Drought is the temporary shortage of an average water supply due to 
shortages in precipitation.  Low precipitation translates to less water soaking 
into the ground; low recharge from low precipitation translates into falling 
groundwater levels; and falling groundwater levels reduce and can even 
reverse the movement of water to tributary streams, drying them up 
entirely.
205
  In a water rights neighborhood where the principal sources of 
                                                          
 201.  In re Central Nebraska Public Power and Irr. Dist., 699 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Neb. 2005) 
(citing Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005)). 
 202.  Id. at 378. 
 203.  Tarlock, Future of Prior Appropriation, supra note 109, at 770. 
 204.  1956 REPORT, supra note 125, at 37. 
 205.  See WINTER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1–3 (describing “[t]he Hydrologic Cycle and 
Interactions of Ground Water and Surface Water”). 
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water supply are surface waters and alluvial groundwater, surface rights will 
typically be senior to alluvial groundwater rights.  Drought reduces the 
number of rights that can divert from that supply; but as precipitation returns 
to normal, increased recharge restores groundwater levels and corresponding 
streamflows accordingly.  In this regard, streamflow is the final “product” of 
the hydrological cycle.  Droughts force the administration of water rights by 
priority on a regular basis, and prior appropriation imposes fairly clear and 
reliable consequences as water rights owners divert according to their 
respective priorities.  Absent non-diverting, environmental flow water rights 
or minimum streamflow requirements, the owners of surface water rights 
can divert the entire stream if the total of those rights meets or exceeds its 
available flow.  Because almost all of the streams in the West are over-
appropriated by diverting water rights, and because minimum streamflow 
requirements do not necessarily trump senior water rights,
206
 stream-drying 
can occur on a regular basis.  Yet when drought dries up the stream, the 
surface water shortage cannot get worse, because no more diversion from 
the stream is possible until the drought abates and flows return.
207
  After all, 




Groundwater depletion is a different phenomenon.  While surface water 
                                                          
 206.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a to -703c (2013) (requiring withholding of necessary 
water for legislatively ordered “minimum desirable streamflows”). 
 207.  This is a generalized scenario, and so some qualification is probably appropriate.  In a 
situation where there is a substantial alluvial supply, such as the South Platte River in Colorado, it is 
probable that alluvial wells will not be pumping in such a manner as to worsen stream drying, 
because those wells will either be shut off as a result of their junior priority to senior surface rights, 
or will be pumping and providing augmentation or substitute supply water to compensate for that 
pumping.  In a situation where there is little alluvial supply, such as the Verdigris River in southern 
Kansas, few alluvial rights exist.  Both of these situations presume that the administration of junior 
groundwater rights is legally available, as they are in Colorado (for tributary groundwater) and in 
Kansas (for all water), and that such administration actually takes place.  Where it is not legally 
available, as in Nebraska, or where it does not take place, the problem of stream drying can become 
considerably worse by lowering the water table below the streambed, creating losing reaches of 
streams. 
 208.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(f) (Supp. 2012) (requiring that “water is available in 
excess of the requirements of all vested rights that relate to such supply and all appropriation rights 
of earlier date that relate to such supply”).  In such a situation, surface water rights could 
conceivably change the point of diversion from the stream to a groundwater well, but in Kansas, 
such a change may be more difficult than it appears for at least two reasons.  Substantively, some 
western water codes treat surface and groundwater supplies as distinct sources of supply in certain 
administrative situations, which can rule out such a change.  See, e.g., KAN ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-9(b) 
(2010) (identifying, as distinct, “groundwater or surface water”).  Procedurally, such a change 
requires an application and administrative approval, can be as time consuming as applying for a new 
water right due to the no-injury rule, and is not necessarily reversible.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
82a-708b (2013) (outlining extensive application procedures for changing certain attributes of water 
rights).  
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rights divert from streamflow, groundwater pumping intervenes earlier in the 
hydrological cycle, intercepting water that would otherwise flow to the 
stream.  Depletion occurs when groundwater pumping exceeds recharge 
from the hydrological cycle.  The over-pumping of groundwater produces 
depletions whose effects vary according to the local hydrological situation, 
such as the degree of connection of the groundwater formation to a surface 
water body, the geology of the formation, and the location of the pumping 
well or wells.  Where the groundwater is alluvial, in a permeable and porous 
formation, and where the well is near a stream, then the impact of pumping 
can show up relatively quickly, depleting streamflows during the same 
irrigation season in which pumping takes place, sometimes almost 
immediately.  In this situation, shutting down a junior groundwater right can 
have nearly the same effect as shutting down a junior surface right.  
Different hydrological situations can produce much different effects, 
however.  Where the groundwater formation is farther away from the stream, 
in a less permeable and porous formation, and where the well is far from the 
stream, or some combination of all three, then the effect of pumping on 
streamflow lags behind the pumping itself.  These depletions are known as 
delayed or “lagged” depletions, and their effect on streamflow can take 
years, even decades, to show up after the pumping itself takes place.  Unless 
groundwater pumping is reduced to a sustainable level, lagged depletions 
can become permanent.  Finally, where the groundwater formation is not 
hydrologically connected to a stream (or minimally so), then the depletions 
cannot be replaced by recharge into streams from surplus precipitation; these 
are permanent depletions, the predominant type of depletion across the 
Ogallala.  Over-appropriation of groundwater produces depletions; over-
appropriation of non-renewable groundwater produces permanent 
depletions. 
Depletion has less immediate consequences than drought, but those 
consequences are more profound.  Depletion usually takes longer to appear, 
in the form of reduced streamflow; but its effects on the hydrological system 
can endure far longer.  Because it takes longer to appear but endures longer 
as well, depletion presents a series of problems about groundwater rights, 
especially their reliability over the long term.  For the most part, both the 
owners of groundwater rights and the state have avoided these problems.  In 
Kansas, this practice of avoidance has become recognizable, and it has 
produced a property right whose actual use does not correspond with its 
formal legal contours. 
Across western Kansas, owners of groundwater rights know that the 
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depletion of the Ogallala threatens to reduce their property interests over the 
long term.
209
  Yet they have mostly avoided deploying the legal tools 
available to protect themselves.  Most of them comply with their annual 
pumping limits and the other terms of their rights;
210
 but because the 
Ogallala is over-appropriated, this widespread compliance does not address 
the problem of depletion.  They have mostly avoided using the most obvious 
tool at their disposal, that of prior appropriation.  Although Kansas contains 
nearly 40,000 groundwater rights, most of which draw from the Ogallala,
211
 
only sixteen groundwater impairment claims were filed with DWR between 
2006 and 2008, and most of these were in north-central Kansas, away from 
the Ogallala.
212
  Owners do not need to rely solely upon DWR to protect 
their rights; Kansas water law grants them the express right to pursue 
impairment and other actions independently in court.
213
  Yet senior 
groundwater pumpers are hardly racing to the courthouse to do so: only two 
impairment lawsuits appear to have been brought in the last four decades.
214
  
Kansas so far lacks a reported case on the impairment of groundwater rights. 
What accounts for this huge disparity between the number of valuable 
senior rights that are threatened by impairment due to groundwater 
depletion, and the statistically miniscule number of such rights that have 
been protected by the chief engineer or by the owners themselves in court?  
Put another way, if a principal virtue of the KWAA is its centralized 
jurisdiction over both surface and groundwater,
215
 why aren’t its most 
threatened beneficiaries using it more frequently to defend themselves?  
Two well-known creatures stand ready to explain.  First and most 
                                                          
 209.  For example, the home page on the Northwest Kansas GMD 4 website features a 
hydrograph from an index well in Thomas County that is updated on the website every two hours.  
GMD4 Hompage, NW. KAN. GROUNDWATER MGMT. DIST. NO. 4, http://www.gmd4.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2014).  The well declined over ten feet between 2010 and 2013.  Id.  
 210.  Over ninety-nine percent of Kansas water rights owners “comply with state water usage 
and water-reporting regulations.”  John C. Peck & Burke W. Griggs, Groundwater Law and 
Management: The Asia (IWMI)-Kansas Program, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 315, 332 (2008). 
 211.  2011 Active Points of Diversion – Groundwater, KAN. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, available at 
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Water%20Rights%20and%20Water%20Use/index.ht
ml#2011%2520Active%2520Water-Right-Permitted%2520Points%2520of%2520Diversion%2520-
%2520Ground%2520Water.jpg (Kansas groundwater atlas showing locations of 39,506 active 
groundwater points of diversion, primarily above the Ogallala-High Plains Aquifer). 
 212.  KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, FACT SHEET: 
INVESTIGATING IMPAIRMENT COMPLAINTS 2 (Apr. 2009), http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-
source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/impairmentinvestigations.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 213.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-716, -721a (2013). 
 214.  File v. Solomon Valley Feedlot, Inc. (Mitchell Co., Kansas, No. 8831, Nov. 29, 1972); 
Garetson Brothers v. American Warrior, Inc. (Haskell Co., Kansas, No. 12-CV-9, 2012).   
 215.  See, e.g., 1956 REPORT, supra note 125, at 9. 
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predictably, there is the creature awakened by Garrett Hardin in 1968, the 
“tragedy of the commons.”
216
  Depending upon the audience and the 
occasion, it can speak about groundwater using the vocabularies of 
economics and political science,
217
 as well as law.
218
  Yet the Kansas variety 
of the tragedy is a peculiar one: unlike more commonly studied states such 
as California and Texas, senior groundwater right holders in Kansas have 
discrete and quantified rights, and they can eject and enjoin juniors who 
impair their rights.
219
  In theory, prior appropriation “limits individual use 
and produces a relatively broad and stable distribution of water use 
opportunities.”
220
  In practice in Kansas, the reality of over-appropriation 
complicates the analysis considerably.  Yet sixteen impairment complaints 
out of nearly 40,000 groundwater rights?  That is not a tragedy; it seems 
more like a farce. 
Second, there is that darling of the law and economics movement, the 
Coase Theorem.
221
 This theorem candidly assumes that transaction costs are 
zero,
222
 and holds that a change in the rule of liability—in this case, the laws 
and regulations that give senior water rights holders the ability to hold 
juniors liable for impairment—will not affect the allocation and use of 
resources, either in water, money, or other resources.  As applied to western 
water rights, Coasean reasoning would appear to conclude that making a 
junior water right owner liable for his impairing a senior right would not 
cause the junior to reduce his water use.  The junior, who could be shut 
down or held liable for impairment, has a legal incentive to deploy all 
economically justified measures to keep his water use within the limits of his 
permit.  But according to Coase, even if the chief engineer did not shut the 
                                                          
 216.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–48 (1968), available at 
https://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full.   
 217.  A most notable scholar in these related fields is the late Elinor Ostrom. See, e.g., 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  A 
more recent work that relies upon Ostrom’s approach for an optimistic appraisal of Kansas water 
management (at least in the interstate context) is EDELLA SCHRAGER AND WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, 
EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS 156–59 (2008). 
 218.  See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 722–23 (1986) (discussing the impact of legal ownership 
rights on certain properties that are open for public use); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically 
Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249–53 (2000) (discussing 
the tragedy of the commons in the context of groundwater shortages).  For an early discussion of the 
subject, see Samuel C. Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil, Sea, and Seashore, 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 425 (1934). 
 219.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701(f), 82a-717a (2012).  
 220.  Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 109, at 887. 
 221.  Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960). 
 222.  Id. at 15. 
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junior down, or even if a court did not find the junior liable for damages, the 
senior water right holder—the victim of a water rights “trespass” by the 
junior—would still pay the junior to reduce his water use so that it did not 
impair the senior right.  Theoretically, market forces would thus internalize 
the costs of regulation, regardless of how the law determines impairment.
223
 
There are numerous other explanations for such apparently irrational 
behavior, so let us dispense with the least credible ones first.  There is the 
explanation that groundwater irrigators do not have an accurate 
understanding of the water rights they have in the first place.  Such an 
explanation may be possible in riparian states or western states whose 
groundwater codes do not require metering or otherwise condone such 
uncertainty, but in Kansas such an explanation is demonstrably false and 
legally indefensible: vested water rights must be quantified and approved,
224
 
and post-1945 water right certificates specify and limit their amounts, rates, 
and locations.
225
  There is the explanation that Kansas irrigators are not 
aware of the problem of depletion and impairment.  Given the technological 
and financial sophistication of most Kansas irrigators, the legal requirement 
to report their annual pumping amounts,
226
 and the common awareness of 
groundwater depletion,
227
 this explanation can at best apply only to a small 
set of unusually obtuse irrigators.  There is the explanation that defending 
rights—either through an administrative impairment action or a civil 
lawsuit—costs more than such a defense is worth.  Given both the low 
expense of an impairment investigation and the substantial difference in the 




The better explanations evoke comparisons with the legal situation 
facing California miners in the mid-nineteenth century.  Because of their 
water situation, Ogallala irrigators in Kansas do not see much utility in the 
enforcement capabilities of the water law they have received—in this case, 
the sometimes crystalline, other times muddy, tools of prior appropriation.
229
  
                                                          
 223.  Id. at 8.  My characterization of the Coase Theorem in this paragraph relies upon ROBERT 
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 2 (1991). 
 224.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-704a (2012). 
 225.  Id. § 82a-701(f) (Supp. 2012). 
 226.  Id. § 82a-732 (2012). 
 227.  See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 20, at 1; Tarlock, Future of Prior Appropriation, supra note 
109, at 770.  
 228.  The administrative procedure for an impairment investigation does require the complainant 
to submit a report prepared by a licensed well driller, a professional engineer, or a licensed geologist.  
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1(b)(2)(A), 5-4-1a(a) (2010). 
 229.  For the crystal, see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-706b, -716 (2013); for the mud, see KAN. 
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While they continue to operate under a comprehensive prior appropriation 
regime for both groundwater and surface water, their response to this 
comprehensiveness has largely been one of avoidance.  That avoidance can 
have good reasons.  A causal connection between an impairing junior 
groundwater right and an impaired senior groundwater right can be difficult 
to establish.
230
  It is much more difficult to assign impairment in a 
groundwater-dominated system than it is in a surface water system.
231
  Is the 
impairment beyond a reasonable economic limit?
232
  This question does not 
produce a prompt answer.  Prior appropriation in a surface system has 
immediate and discrete consequences; but in a groundwater-dominated 
system, its consequences are uncertain, and potentially too extreme to 
consider.  Making a groundwater call can have greater impacts than making 
a surface water call: protecting a senior groundwater right at its full 
authorized quantity may require that many nearby junior rights be shut 
down, and for a long time.  Groundwater irrigation communities in Kansas 
are acutely aware of this potential consequence, which may explain why so 
few irrigators have brought impairment complaints.  Strict enforcement of 
priorities in a non-renewable groundwater system raises fundamental 
questions of fairness,
233
 and can seem “harsher and less just than a system 
based upon the idea of proration.”
234
  The result is that they are deliberately 
avoiding the tools of prior appropriation, and effectively sharing the water 
shortage. 
Having avoided the available legal tools to protect their senior rights, 
irrigators have developed alternative methods to avoid, or at least delay, the 
consequences of administration by priority.  Irrigators who pump from the 
same declining aquifer area know the relative priorities within it, and they 
know their rights.  Using this knowledge, they can employ contracts with 
other irrigators to forestall the legal effects of a shortage.  Juniors (who 
otherwise might be cut off as the result of an impairment investigation) 
make arrangements with senior water right holders (who otherwise might 
initiate one).  These arrangements can be as complex as the parties require, 
and can include waivers of legal claims (including the right to make a 
priority call), non-diversion agreements, water-supply agreements, financial 
                                                          
ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1a (2010). 
 230.  Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 109, at 899–901.  For reasons set forth 
more fully below, the author does not share Professor Tarlock’s categorical assertion that “priority 
does not work for nonrenewable resources such as ground water aquifers.”  Id. at 900. 
 231.  See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1 (2010). 
 232.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-711, 82a-708b (2013). 
 233.  Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 109, at 902.  
 234.  1956 REPORT, supra note 125, at 37. 
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settlements, and land and water-right purchase options, to name a few.
235
  
Prior appropriation works to some extent in this context: as a threat to prod 
private contractual arrangements that resolve otherwise looming conflicts 
over a water shortage; as a risk allocation mechanism; and as a signifier of 
value—the more senior the priority, the stronger the bargaining position at 
contract.
236
  On one hand, these arrangements appear to validate the Coase 
Theorem: owners have contracted their way to positions of mutual 
advantage, without the chief engineer intervening to protect the seniors.  Yet 
on the other hand, the theorem appears to have it backward: as applied to 
water rights, the theorem dictates the opposite arrangement, by which 
seniors would pay juniors.
237
 
Regardless of theory, the aquifer itself is in permanent decline, the 
shortage is not temporary, and so the agreements are inevitably 
impermanent.  Except for cases where water rights owners have contracted 
away the defense of their rights forever—effectively exchanging the 
extinction of their water rights for a price—the viability of these contractual 
arrangements, like the water rights themselves, remains dependent on the 
water being available to pump.  Irrigators who engage in these contracts are 
buying access to water, protection from liability, or both; perhaps more 
importantly, they are buying time.  Some such contracts could arguably be 
deniable by the chief engineer on the grounds that they violate the public 
interest; but for now, DWR actively encourages them.
238
 
These contractual arrangements assume a shared concern about the 
long-term future of the water supply.  That assumption, however, may not be 
as widespread as one might think.  Irrigators faced with the problem of 
multiple declining wells can consolidate these “crippled” wells into a 
common irrigation system.
239
  This consolidation enables the further 
depletion of the groundwater supply, by combining individual wells that are 
not capable of viable irrigation on their own (and that otherwise might be 
retired or rededicated to less water-intensive uses) into a system that is at 
                                                          
 235.  In water law parlance, a “non-diversion agreement” is an agreement not to pump or 
otherwise divert water from the source of supply.  If such an agreement concerns an area in Kansas 
that is closed to new appropriations of groundwater, a non-diversion agreement could be perpetual, 
since groundwater rights are no longer subject to abandonment in such areas.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
82a-718(e) (2012). 
 236.  Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 109, at 901–02; Hobbs, Protecting Prior 
Appropriation Water Rights, supra note 111, at 17. 
 237.  See supra text accompanying notes 221–223.  
 238.  See supra note 223.  
 239.  See, e.g., LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 10–11 (reporting the comments of Mr. Gary 
Ross). 
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least temporarily viable, pumping water at the well’s (declining) maximum 
yield capacity.
240
  Even with the exhaustion of large portions of the Ogallala 
in sight, continued irrigation at maximum levels is still viewed as rational 
behavior, based on the economic expectations of the groundwater irrigation 
community, as measured by gross revenues, purchases of agricultural 
equipment and inputs, and tax revenues, all of which are higher on irrigated 
ground than on dry land ground.  Between the commonly perceived dictates 
of the discount rate and the difficulty of making an “intertemporal tradeoff” 
by which irrigators forgo present levels of pumping to avoid uncertain future 
losses,
241
 water left in the ground is still largely believed to translate to 
money left on the table. 
On the other, depleted side of the groundwater revolution, we have at 
least three serious problems with a groundwater right that draws from the 
non-renewable supplies of the Ogallala.  First, we have a problem of legal 
description: such a right does not necessarily mean what the law says it 
means.  Kansas law proclaims that it is a real property right, and the clear 
implication of that statutory definition is one of permanence, rather than a 
temporary real property right such as a lease, or a right such as a license.
242
  
Yet the water supply upon which that property right depends is not 
permanent; in many areas of the Ogallala, it is effectively gone.
243
  That 
depletion has forced changes, many of them permanent, in the attributes of 
many Kansas Ogallala water rights.  Their typical authorized annual quantity 
and pump rate have declined, often far below their certified quantities; and 
their authorized acreage has shrunk, in proportion to the depletion of the 
well.  In response, many irrigators have changed the locations of their wells 
to a more productive part of the aquifer, a tactic known as “chasing water,” 
and which meets with opposition from neighboring water rights owners who 
may suffer impairment as a result.
244
  As certain wells decline in their 
productivity and become “crippled,” their owners have connected them with 
other such wells, combining them to irrigate fewer and fewer parcels.
245
  As 
                                                          
 240.  An industry standard for a viable irrigation well dedicated to irrigating corn in Kansas is 
400 gallons per minute.  See, e.g., Vision for the Future of Water in Kansas: Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), KAN. WATER OFFICE, 
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 241.  Thompson, supra note 218, at 262–65. 
 242.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (2009) (water right a real property right); id. § 
82a-718 (conditions under which a water right can be abandoned); id. § 82a-705 (water rights cannot 
be obtained by adverse possession).  
 243.  See supra notes 17–18.  
 244.  See, e.g., LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 19. 
 245.  See supra note 239.  
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a consequence of depletion and owners’ response to it, a water rights 
certificate can be a fundamentally misleading document, promising far more 
in “paper water” quantity than the wet water that the aquifer can actually 
deliver, and containing layers of administrative changes that require forensic 
expertise to understand.  In terms of quantity and acreage, the certificate of 
appropriation for a Kansas Ogallala water right may be as misleading and 
defective a document as the decreed water rights on the Cache la Poudre 
River were in 1902.
246
 
That raises the second problem, one of doctrine.  Prior appropriation, as 
adapted to Kansas groundwater rights since 1957, matters less above the 
Ogallala than it does elsewhere in Kansas, and it does not appear to work as 
an enforcement mechanism there.  As described above, irrigators and other 
large water users with senior rights are not deploying their priorities to 
protect themselves from water shortages.  They are not requesting IGUCAs.  
They are filing almost no impairment complaints with DWR.  They are not 
suing junior owners whose pumping is allegedly impairing their senior 
rights.  And when groundwater pumpers do come together to achieve a 
coordinated plan of water conservation, such as the Sheridan County 6 
LEMA, they consistently assert that priority should confer no benefits: all 
irrigation rights should be reduced the same, regardless of priority.
247
  The 
development of groundwater across western Kansas from the 1950s through 
the 1970s produced the expectation that the quantity of water authorized 
under a water right should correspond the irrigation requirements of the 
appurtenant land.
248
  Where priority does not appear to matter (except, 
importantly, in the context of an IGUCA and as a threat in certain 
contractual situations), the result for Kansas, a half century later, may not be 
all that practically different than simply granting water rights or well permits 
in proportion to the amount of land irrigated—an approach effectively 
similar to that of states such as Oklahoma and Nebraska, Ogallala states 
which do not extend the doctrine of prior appropriation to groundwater.
249
 
Third, we have a property problem, one of regulatory uncertainty.  Most 
owners of groundwater rights over the Ogallala in Kansas know all too well 
                                                          
 246.  MEAD, supra note 33. 
 247.  See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  However, the LEMA Order expressly provides 
that nothing shall preclude a water right owner from requesting administration of water rights or 
from bringing an impairment complaint.  LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 38–39. 
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Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 109, at 900–01. 
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that their water supply declines every year.  However, it is unclear what 
property protections they can rely upon; they lack accurate knowledge of 
what they own, and such knowledge is an important stick in the bundle of 
rights that make up a Kansas water right.  This uncertainty is partly the result 
of the nature of water rights regulation in the context of non-renewable 
groundwater.
250
  At one, albeit theoretical extreme, there is the threat of total 
water rights regulation: the administration of water rights by strict priority, 
shutting off many junior rights in a water neighborhood to protect a few 
senior rights.  At least one irrigator with senior rights has recently decided to 
forgo such administrative action, and has so far successfully pursued a civil 
action against a junior water right whose operation has impaired his 
rights.
251
  At the same extreme is the threat of a water rights adjudication: a 
court could take the hydrological evidence of groundwater pumping and 
depletion in a particular area, and then use it to correct the growing 
imbalance between “paper water,” or the authorized quantities of all of the 
water rights certificates in that area, and the actual water supplies remaining.  
Such a correction would likely produce a similar result as administration by 
priority, wherein a few senior water rights retain all of their original 
authorized quantities at the expense of many junior rights.  These are the 
pure and effective regulatory possibilities, available to those who seek them.  
But because priority is not seen as equity over the Ogallala,
252
 and because 
irrigators understand the force of such threats, Kansas law has made them 
unlikely.
253
  As a consequence, a straightforward application of prior 
appropriation to address the permanent drought of the Ogallala is a rational 
but politically offensive impossibility. 
At the other extreme is the threat of total non-regulation.  Owners may 
decide not to protect their water rights.
254
  With some notable exceptions, 
such as the contractual methods discussed above, water rights owners have 
largely made this decision so far.  At the collective scale of the Sheridan 
                                                          
 250.  For a different treatment of the problem of uncertainty, see Thompson, supra note 218, at 
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County 6 LEMA, they have decided to do so only on a temporary basis.
255
  
With the exception of GMD No. 4, no other GMD has yet to initiate a 
LEMA.  The State may effectively condone such a collective decision; so 
far, the chief engineer has neither effected priority administration nor 
initiated proceedings for an IGUCA anywhere over the Ogallala.  In short, 
the extreme of non-regulation is an all too real possibility, borne of the 
collective inaction by water rights owners, GMDs, and DWR.  It is an 
equally rational, equally offensive possibility. 
What is the difference between the extreme threat of total regulation and 
the opposite extreme threat of total non-regulation?  It is a matter of time.  If 
the tools that the KWAA provides to protect water rights are left unused, 
then the groundwater crisis will take care of itself.  Ultimately, in the context 
of non-renewable groundwater, we have a situation that is importantly 
different than that of the classical western water right.  Experts have long 
known that the different hydrological properties of non-renewable 
groundwater required an adjustment to the principles and regulation of a 
classical western water right.
256
  But now that we are in the age of permanent 
depletion, that adjusted property interest in non-renewable groundwater has 
become a permanently damaged interest.  Consider the following contrast. 
The owner of a classical western water right knows what she owns, and 
she knows upon what she can rely.  She knows that conditions are 
variable—some years are drier than others—but that over the long term, the 
water supplies upon which her water right depends will not appreciably 
change (aside from the impacts of climate change).  In wet years, she can 
obtain the full water supply to which her right entitles her.  In normal and 
drier years, she can depend upon her priority, and that priority is meaningful.  
It affects the value of her property interest, because it affects her option to 
make a priority call.  She can rely upon seniors to make such a call, she can 
be relied upon to make one herself, and she can rely upon the historical 
record of water supply availability and water rights administration in her 
water neighborhood.  As a result of these reliable components of her water 
right, the owner of a classical western water right knows to a useful degree 
of accuracy just how much water she can rely upon under variable 
circumstances. 
By contrast, the owner of an Ogallala right knows less about his right, 
and he can depend less upon the protections it claims to confer.  He knows 
that his situation is most decidedly not like that of a surface water drought, 
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whose temporary shortages result from abnormally low precipitation.  The 
aquifer is declining and permanently so.  The temporal variability that 
applies to his surface water counterpart simply does not apply: the owner of 
a groundwater right has been using approximately the same amount of water 
in wet years as he has in drought years, because his Ogallala supply is 
underground, non-tributary, and therefore drought-proof.  Indeed, 
precipitation may not even figure into his irrigation scheduling.
257
  But the 
aquifer is declining: he is facing a permanent water shortage.  In this very 
different shortage situation—that of permanent drought—the owner of an 
Ogallala right cannot really depend upon his priority, because that place is 
not really meaningful.  His priority affects his property interest less directly 
because a priority call in his neighborhood may not secure him water when 
he needs it, given the lag time between cutting off junior well pumping and 
reducing impairment as a result.  His priority is also less meaningful because 
the regulatory outcomes of making a priority call can be slow, unclear, and 
unpredictable.  Outside of contracts with others in his water neighborhood, 
prior appropriation is not a reliable threat—and it is one to which he and his 
neighbors are probably hostile.  The only records upon which he can rely are 
the ever-shrinking quantities recorded in his water use reports, and the all-
too linear increase in his well’s depth to water. 
IV. REFORMING WATER RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF PERMANENT DEPLETION 
The permanent depletion of the Ogallala has degraded the water right 
which depends upon its supplies into a substantially inferior property interest 
as compared to its legal (and legally coequal) antecedent—the classical 
western water right, whose source of supply is annually variable but 
nonetheless permanent.
258
  While this distinction has been recognized in 
statute in Colorado,
259
  Kansas has approached the situation indirectly.  It 
has enacted the statutory mechanisms of IGUCAs and LEMAs to address the 
problem of groundwater depletion on a collective scale,
260
 and it has adopted 
regulations tailored to the distinctive challenges of administering local as 
opposed to regional, or renewable as opposed to non-renewable, supplies of 
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groundwater.
261
  Yet most statutory and regulatory attempts to modify the 
treatment and administration of groundwater rights have not really 
confronted the problem of permanent depletion.  And while most Kansas 
groundwater rights certify what has become over time a hydrologic fiction, 
most of their owners have decided not to engage Kansas law to protect these 
rights in the face of permanent depletion.  Because the groundwater right, its 
owners, and its regulatory structure have all responded to depletion in this 
indirect and evasive manner, the rate of that depletion has accelerated.  
Candor thus compels us to reconsider the groundwater right itself: in 
obedience to the actual hydrological bases upon which the right depends, in 
accordance with its actual rather than perceived legal status, and in 
deference to the cultural, political, and administrative realities that have 
shaped its contours and conferred legitimacy upon its regulation. 
Taking the long view of western water law takes us back to the genesis 
of the KWAA itself, seventy years ago.  Within that perspective, it becomes 
clear that the same four problems which Kansas faced in 1944—of power, of 
doctrine, of quantification, and of the public—have returned with greater 
potency.
262
  This historical view produces four related historical 
observations which, in turn, recommend certain legal and policy reforms to 
address the permanent depletion of the Ogallala. 
The first historical observation concerns power.  The history of the 
exercise and regulation of the property right in groundwater provides a truer 
portrait of that right than its formalistic reflection in the law alone. 
The history of the KWAA is apparently clear and consistent.  The 
Kansas Legislature and Kansas courts have mostly maintained and upheld 
both the centralized administrative structure of DWR and the power and 
jurisdiction of the office of the chief engineer over all of the waters of 
Kansas.  This was a fundamental purpose behind the KWAA, in response to 
the political and legal crises of the 1940s.  The groundwater revolution 
produced statutory changes, most notably in 1957, which modified how the 
chief engineer granted new water rights and protected existing rights, but 
they did not restrict the powers of the office.  The GMD Act recognized the 
arrival of distinct groundwater publics across the Ogallala, and made them 
active partners with DWR in groundwater policy; but unlike Colorado and 
Nebraska, Kansas did not modify the authority of DWR and the chief 
engineer.  The onset of groundwater depletion starting in the late 1960s 
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motivated local groundwater publics to develop the IGUCA statutes.  
Compared to the IGUCA statutes, the LEMA statute grants greater control to 
local groundwater publics in designing a management plan; but they 
cooperate with the chief engineer in producing that plan, and the chief 
engineer retains the same enforcement authority over a LEMA order as he 
does over an IGUCA order, as the local groundwater publics intended. 
But the apparent and formal consistency of this legal power is 
potentially deceptive, and should not be confused with its exercise or lack 
thereof.  The past four decades have shown that the exercise of that power 
largely depends upon the relevant hydrologic context.  In the context of 
alluvial and renewable groundwater, the administration of water rights by 
priority (whether discretely, or collectively as in an IGUCA) protects senior 
rights at the expense of junior rights until conditions improve—whether by 
an increase in precipitation or a reduction in diversions.  In this context, the 
power of the chief engineer has been critical in restoring some degree of 
integrity to the hydrologic systems upon which senior water rights depend, 
including senior rights that protect groundwater-dependent ecosystems; and 
its exercise in this context has been regular, substantial, and mostly 
unchallenged.
263
  By contrast, conditions will almost certainly never improve 
sufficiently to replenish non-renewable groundwater.  From the 1950s 
through the 1970s, the chief engineer exercised his statutory duty to grant 
water rights where water was available at the time;
264
 and because far more 
water rights were approved than the aquifer can sustain, the exercise of this 
authority made the problem of groundwater depletion irreversible.  Owners 
of senior water rights did not challenge those approvals, because impairment 
in the Ogallala context took years to become manifest.  Regulatory action 
over the Ogallala has remained confined mostly to adopting regulations that 
attempt to foreclose future water rights
265
 and place limits on how existing 
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water rights can be changed.
266
 
Beyond these regulatory responses, the GMDs and DWR have done 
little to impose reductions on current groundwater pumping.  In this different 
hydrologic context, many irrigators view administration by priority as an 
arbitrary and regulatory overreach rather than the orderly protection of 
private property rights.  That perception is largely grounded in the fact of the 
Ogallala’s over-appropriation.  As a consequence, administration by priority 
over the Ogallala has been exceptionally rare, and IGUCAs have been 
nonexistent.  One could easily view and probably should view four decades 
of depletion without a direct regulatory, legal, or political response as a 
major policy failure.  But such a judgment is as obvious as it is unhelpful, 
for it obscures what that inaction reveals about the political culture of 
Ogallala irrigators.  That culture accepts some regulatory actions as 
legitimate but not others, even though all such actions are entirely legal and 
many of them are hydrologically imperative.  For better and for worse, the 
chief engineer has understood this distinction between legitimacy and 
illegitimacy; for worse, the wider public has paid little attention to it at all.  
Water policy initiatives that have not engaged the political and cultural 
realities of groundwater irrigation in Kansas have produced little more than 
failure and further inaction.
267
 
In light of this impasse—an impasse not over what is legal and 
necessary, but over what is legitimate—the LEMA statute and its first 
application in northwest Kansas provide some guide to how Kansas 
irrigators view the legitimate use of regulatory power over non-renewable 
groundwater on a wide scale.  They recognize that significant reductions in 
pumping are necessary to extend the life of the aquifer.  They are willing to 
accept such reductions, but with some important provisos that deviate 
significantly from the KWAA.  The reductions for irrigation rights should 
apply equally, without regard for priority; higher-value uses of water such as 
municipal, domestic, recreational, and industrial use should receive lesser 
reductions; and the penalties for violating a LEMA order should be higher 
than usual.  These are the principal elements of the local management plan.  
The Sheridan County 6 LEMA provides an example of how water rights 
owners have “achieve[d] cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from 
legally established entitlements” such as priority, as the Coase Theorem 
might suppose, “but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive norms of 
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failure due to opposition from western Kansas). 
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neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”
268
  And unlike the sort 
of resolution that Coase predicted—mutual advantage without state 
supervision—that plan depends upon state authority, because the irrigators 
specifically sought the chief engineer’s supervision and enforcement.  The 
management plan achieved a remarkable level of support thanks largely to 
the technical authority of state entities—the Kansas Geological Survey, 
irrigation experts and economists at Kansas State University, and the 
logistical expertise of both DWR and GMD No. 4.  It depends upon the 
support of the chief engineer as a threshold matter, and upon the regulatory 
authority of his office and his water commissioner to enforce.  In short, the 
Sheridan County 6 LEMA may provide a blueprint for how to achieve 
meaningful reductions in groundwater depletion in Kansas.  It may also 
reveal a lasting change in the political culture of groundwater irrigation. 
It is too soon to tell, and political culture is local.  Optimists may point 
to the Sheridan County 6 LEMA in GMD No. 4, and to discussions in GMD 
No. 1 to establish a district-wide LEMA.
269
  Pessimists may point to the 
temporary duration of the Sheridan County 6 LEMA.
270
  They will point to 
the idea of building a pipeline project that would divert water from the 
Missouri River in northeast Kansas and pump it over 300 miles and 3,000 
vertical feet uphill to the high plains of western Kansas
271
—a plan redolent 
of earlier trans-basin schemes
272
 and as ambitious as the Central Arizona 
                                                          
 268.  ELLICKSON, supra note 223, at 4, 123–206.  
 269.  WESTERN KANSAS GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1, 40TH ANNUAL 
MEETING (2013), available at 
http://www.gmd1.org/ACTIVITIES_2013_Annual_Meeting_FINA_take_Mar19aWEBSITE.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
 270.  See LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 22–23. 
 271.  See, e.g., MARK RUDE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTHWEST KANSAS GROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT NO. 3, KANSAS GROWS WHERE WATER FLOWS: THE KANSAS AQUEDUCT 
PROJECT (KAP), available at 
http://www.gmd3.org/pdf/2013/2013FallKDHEAqueductDiscussion.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).   
 272.  See JOHN OPIE, OGALLALA: WATER FOR A DRY LAND 274–86 (2d ed. 2006) (summarizing 
various plans to divert water from outside the Ogallala for purposes of aquifer recharge).  The most 
ambitious of these plans, the North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA) plan, 
envisioned diverting 152 million acre-feet of water per year—more than the annual flow of the 
Mississippi River—from the large rivers of northwest Canada, and then distributing that water across 
the West.  The NAWAPA plan’s cost estimate ran to $300 billion in 1982 dollars ($1.174 trillion in 
2014 dollars), “roughly equivalent . . . to the annual defense budget of the United States [in 
1977] . . . .”  Id. at 279.  The 1982 High Plains Study commissioned by the United States Department 
of Commerce explored the feasibility of importing water to the High Plains along four routes from 
the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, as identified by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  The 
estimated cost of piping water along “Route B,” from the Missouri River in northeast Kansas (near 
St. Joseph, Missouri) to west-central Kansas, ranged from $226 to $569 per acre-foot per year in 
1977 dollars ($884 to $2,226 per acre-foot per year in 2014 dollars respectively), and did not include 
the cost of distributing the water from the pipeline terminals to individual farms, making “outside-
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Project on the Colorado River.
273
  Until such a pipe dream becomes reality, 
there is the LEMA process, which harnesses the power of Kansas 
groundwater communities, acting through their GMDs, together with the 
power of the state over its groundwater resources, acting through DWR and 
the chief engineer.  Given the history of Kansas groundwater, that is 
progress.  The multi-million acre-foot question is whether the GMDs will 
exercise that power.  If they do not, they may secure a reputation in 




A second and similar historical observation concerns custom and its 
relationship to legal doctrines in water.  The customary use of these 
doctrines by water rights owners and the state, not their mere codification, 
determines their meaning in practice.  Policy makers should therefore 
consider any amendment of these doctrines with caution, and with a clear 
understanding of their interdependence and the regulatory and transactional 
contexts in which they cooperate. 
Consider two principal doctrines of western water law, prior 
appropriation and beneficial use.  Like other western states, Kansas fuses 
these doctrines.
275
  The doctrine of prior appropriation has been the law of 
western Kansas for nearly 150 years, and the law of all of Kansas since 
1945.  Such was the belief in its legitimacy that not one irrigator challenged 
it along the Arkansas River between 1886 and 1945.
276
  Such was the belief 
in its value in defining, quantifying, and protecting water rights that it was 
adopted statewide in 1945.
277
  In a system of surface water rights and 
alluvial groundwater such as the Arkansas River, prior appropriation and 
beneficial use can operate in relative harmony: because a dry year makes 
beneficial use impossible for all rights, priority administration enables the 
full beneficial use of at least some senior rights.  Yet the groundwater 
revolution pitted these doctrines against each other.  As described above, 
strict application of the doctrine of priority would have greatly retarded and 
                                                          
water costs prohibitive.”  Id. at 286. “Route B” is similar to the route envisioned by the Kansas 
Aqueduct Project, note 271 supra.  
 273.  For the Central Arizona Project (CAP), see SAX, THOMPSON, LESHY, & ABRAMS, supra 
note 14, at 698–99 (describing the $4.7 billion (as of 2000, or $6.47 billion in 2014 dollars), 1.5 
million acre-feet, “highly subsidized public works project” whose cost made irrigation water from 
the CAP unaffordable to Arizona irrigators).  Irrigation water from the CAP has a real cost of $2,000 
per acre-foot per year in 2000 ($2,753 in 2014 dollars).  OPIE, supra note 272, at 279. 
 274.  Peck, supra note 131, at 457. 
 275.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-706, 82a-707(a).   
 276.  See 1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 45. 
 277.  See supra text accompanying notes 81–114. 
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even prohibited irrigators from putting the waters of the Ogallala to 
beneficial use; in response to that recognition, the KWAA was amended, and 
regulations adopted, that effectively place the beneficial use doctrine over 
that of prior appropriation.  Kansas is no outlier in this regard; across the 
West, the duty to put groundwater to beneficial use can all too easily 
displace the duty to enforce the prior appropriation doctrine.
278
 
Yet prior appropriation still retains value over the Ogallala.  It quantifies 
rights, and frames the problem of over-appropriation more clearly than it 
would be framed otherwise.
279
  It is a familiar doctrine, and one that is used.  
Irrigators across the Ogallala have not directly employed it in the regulatory 
arena, to initiate impairment investigations and priority calls.  Yet they have 
employed it indirectly as a regulatory tool—by assigning value to priority as 
a risk-allocation mechanism in contractual agreements intended to avoid 
such investigations and calls.  And in the transactional arena, the priority of 
a right to use Ogallala groundwater still determines much of its market 
value.  Priority remains a valid regulatory backstop and a signifier of value. 
As for the doctrine of beneficial use, both the well-known fact of the 
Ogallala’s permanent depletion and our appreciation of that depletion as a 
serious problem raise the question of whether current, highly depleting 
beneficial uses of water remain reasonable.  The amount of water 
beneficially used under a water right must be reasonable: this is an important 
and uncontroversial corollary of the beneficial use doctrine.
280
  Similarly, a 
water right does not entitle its owner to waste water.
281
  Just as the doctrine 





 or culturally 
marginal
284
 for earlier generations of water users, the principle of reasonable 
                                                          
 278.  See G. EMLEN HALL, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE 
PECOS RIVER 119–120 (2002) (“Both principles [i.e., beneficial use and prior appropriation] were 
equally embedded in the New Mexico State Constitution of 1912.  But State Engineer Steve 
Reynolds believed in the first principle and disliked the second so much that he disregarded it.”). 
 279.  1956 REPORT, supra note 125, at 37 (prior appropriation “establishes the character, extent, 
and limits of water rights with greater clarity and certainty than the other doctrines”). 
 280.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707(e) (“Appropriation rights in excess of the reasonable needs of 
the appropriators shall not be allowed.”).  See also Schodde v. Twin Falls Land and Water Co., 224 
U.S. 107, 118 (1912) (the reasonableness of a beneficial use of water under a water right is an 
essential attribute of that right).   
 281.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-1-1(kkkk)(4) (defining waste as “the application of water to an 
authorized beneficial use in excess of the needs for this use”); Id. § 5-5-7 (prohibiting waste and 
authorizing the chief engineer to suspend use of a water right pursuant to a finding of waste). 
 282.  Id. § 5-1-1(o)(8) (recognizing artificial aquifer recharge as a beneficial use). 
 283.  Id. §§ 5-1-1(o)(5), 5-1-1(qq) (recognizing the industrial use of secondary and tertiary oil 
recovery as a beneficial use). 
 284.  Id. §§ 5-1-1(6), 5-1-1(mmm) (recognizing recreational use as a beneficial use, including 
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use is not a fixed one.  Rather, it is a dynamic principle  that has responded 
to changes in hydrology, technology, scientific information, water demand, 
and social and economic conditions.
285
  The same goes for waste: “what is a 
beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a 
waste of water at a later time.”
286
  And vice versa: in 1944, water that was 
permitted to flow toward the ocean, undiverted for beneficial use, was 
assumed to be water wasted.
287
  Four decades later, such waters received 
statutory protection—but not against diversions by senior rights.
288
  States 
now recognize the value of leaving water in the stream as a beneficial 
recreational use; the Colorado Water Conservation Board holds such 
instream flow rights on 8,000 miles of Colorado streams.
289
 
Changes in water doctrine apply with equal force to groundwater.  
Growing corn across the Great Plains west of the 99th Meridian was a 
reckless idea for over a century, unless one’s farm was located within one of 
the region’s relatively few surface water irrigation districts.  The revolutions 
in postwar agriculture changed that mindset.  Groundwater irrigation 
systems and Ogallala supplies sprinkled water on demand across the Great 
Plains, and the law evolved to accommodate these higher levels of water 
use.
290
  The green revolution in agriculture produced corn and soybean 
hybrids that could survive western conditions; innovations in fertilizer, 
pesticide, and herbicide chemistry produced higher and more reliable yields; 
and advances in biotechnology and genetics produced genetically engineered 
crops that reduce the need for applied chemicals.  These innovations, 
alongside those of mechanized agriculture, enabled fewer and fewer 
irrigators to farm increasingly higher acreages.  Efficiency gains in irrigation 
technology and more sophisticated methods of timing the application of 
irrigation water produced higher yields from the same amount of water.  
These advancements have produced large corn and soybean monocultures 
across the Ogallala, and their stakeholders and regulators have produced 
water regulations that assume a commensurately high level of water use.
291
  
What was inconceivable a century ago has become normal. 
                                                          
use dedicated to fish and wildlife). 
 285.  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 52 Cal. App. 3d 828 (1975) (rev’d on 
other grounds) (stressing the need for flexibility in construing the law “to keep pace with the needs 
and transformations constantly taking place in our rapidly changing society”). 
 286.  Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935). 
 287.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 52. 
 288.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-703a, 82a-703b (establishing minimum desirable streamflows).   
 289.  Hobbs, supra note 139, at 9. 
 290.  See supra text accompanying notes 125–28. 
 291.  See supra text accompanying note 132. 
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Precisely because of these changes, we remain bound, just as we were in 
1855, to take notice of the condition of the country.
292
  That condition—one 
of rapid and permanent groundwater depletion—dictates a conclusion that 
the present normalcy cannot endure.  As the groundwater revolution 
expanded the scope of what was a reasonable use of water, the depletion of 
the Ogallala should force a contraction in that scope.  Have current levels of 
irrigation become recognized as unreasonable or wasteful in light of the fact 
of depletion?  If the state were to make such a finding, then the authorized 
quantity of the groundwater right could be reduced, in light of that 
recognition, to a less water-intensive but still beneficial irrigation use; and 
that reduction, properly implemented, should withstand a legal challenge as 
an unconstitutional taking of property under the United States and Kansas 
Constitutions.
293
  No one can acquire a protectable property interest in the 
unreasonable use of water; while the determination of reasonable use 
depends on the circumstances of each case, it cannot be resolved in isolation 
from “statewide considerations of transcendent importance.  Paramount 
among these we see the ever increasing need for the conservation of 
water . . . .”
294
  As for waste, it has always applied differently to 
groundwater than it has to surface water: unused groundwater does not flow 
toward the ocean,
295
 but stays in place, protected from evaporative loss and 
available for future beneficial use.  Nonuse of non-renewable groundwater 
thus cannot amount to waste—a logical conclusion stressed by the most 
articulate opponent of the KWAA himself.
296
 
Consider instead that the state, perhaps at the behest of those with 
interests in current levels of groundwater pumping, deems present levels of 
irrigation to be reasonable.  If so, then the rapid depletion of the Ogallala 
must also be reasonable.  These are not hypothetical positions; they are the 
                                                          
 292.  Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).  
 293.  See Peck, supra note 130, at 501–05, 509 (suggesting how reductions in water use that 
represent “reasonably necessary quantities for the type of use” would pass constitutional muster 
under a takings analysis).  For a recent comprehensive survey of takings cases in groundwater that 
reinforces Professor Peck’s view, see Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 
254 (2013) (arguing that “the application of a relatively mainstream version of takings doctrine, 
which treats groundwater rights as property but allows substantial government regulation of 
groundwater use, is both the most traditional and the most theoretically justifiable approach”). 
 294.  City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000).  Barstow construed 
article X, § 2 of the California Constitution, which requires that “the waste or unreasonable use or 
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented . . . .”  As such, it accords well with KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 82a-707(e), which forbids appropriations in excess of the reasonable needs of the 
appropriator. 
 295.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 52.   
 296.  F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1175 (Kan. 1981) (Schroeder, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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implicit positions of the present.
297
  Yet these present positions are 
irreconcilable with the longstanding status of a Kansas groundwater right as 
a permanent real property right.  A water right that enables its owner to 
eliminate the source of water upon which that right depends cannot be a 
permanent real property right; it cannot even be a usufructuary one.
298
  A 
policy determination endorsing current rates of groundwater depletion 
requires a proportionate demotion in the legal status of the groundwater 
right.  This is not a policy position; it is a logical one. 
A third historical observation concerns quantification.  A primary goal 
in balancing prior appropriation, reasonable use, and other doctrines in 
western water law is to achieve a stable, reliable, and predictable property 
interest; yet without a definite and reliable quantification of both the 
groundwater right and the water supply upon which it depends, there can be 
little reliance upon it as a property right and little predictability in its 
regulation.  This is not a doctrinal matter; hydrological and legal uncertainty 
about the future of the Ogallala is “the greatest single issue” facing western 
Kansas water users seeking reliable, long-term water supplies.
299
  The 
inaccuracies and excesses of water claims under the prior appropriation 
doctrine during the nineteenth century produced absurd levels of over-
appropriation that called out for administrative oversight.
300
  The need to 
accurately quantify the relationship between available water supply and 
actual water rights motivated the repeal of the riparian doctrine in 1945.
301
  
Yet the 1957 amendments to the KWAA encouraged the chief engineer to 
postpone a true reckoning of that relationship, and he did, producing a 
degree of over-appropriation in groundwater that is as bad if not worse than 
the over-appropriation of western streams a century ago. 
Given the extent of the Ogallala’s over-appropriation and its depletion, 
the need seems clear for a return to the quantitative clarity that was briefly 
achieved between 1945 and 1957.  Such a return should correct Kansas 
groundwater rights according to the reality of their available water supply, 
so that owners, buyers, and third parties can rely upon what water is actually 
reliable, rather than upon fictional quantities that the aquifer can no longer 
                                                          
 297.  See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-23-4a(b).   
 298.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “usufruct” as the right to use 
property “without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the 
property over time”). 
 299.  Ramsey, supra note 162, at 522. 
 300.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 301.  See supra text accompanying notes 88–93. 
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yield.  A water right does not guarantee water,
302
 but it is legally and 
factually predicated on the durable availability of the water supply.
303
  Yet 
depletion has made much of that water permanently unavailable, and it has 
made the annual authorized quantities of Kansas groundwater rights 
permanently fictitious and misleading, undermining the central predicate of 
tens of thousands of real property rights.  That is no way to run a legal 
regime for real property, as Kansas water experts recognized in 1944. 
The fact of the Ogallala’s depletion raises another quantification issue: 
the need for clarity in terms of time.  The prior appropriation doctrine is 
backward-looking, favoring the oldest rights, which enjoy higher value 
because they are most reliable in times of shortage.  The groundwater 
revolution looked forward instead, favoring the principle of beneficial use 
above the rule of priority, and neither groundwater irrigators nor the state 
engaged priority all that much as a regulatory device.  But the present  
predominance of the beneficial use doctrine revives the issue of temporal 
priority, yet with a different perspective: the most important issue across the 
Ogallala is not who has the oldest rights, but whose wells will last 
dependably in the future.  This is largely a hydrological question, not a legal 
one, but it raises an important policy question.  Because Kansas law 
administers water rights according to priority of appropriation, should it 
also, in the context of non-renewable groundwater, consider a logical 
corollary of that principle in the context of non-renewable groundwater, 
namely, priority of depletion?  The most vulnerable groundwater areas 
across the Ogallala are already recognized as “high priority areas,” and that 
priority is defined hydrologically.
304
  Should these high priority areas be 
administered or otherwise regulated differently than others?  In an individual 
impairment situation, should wells with different estimated life spans be 
treated differently?  If so, should the wells with longer life spans be favored 
above those with shorter life spans, or placed below them?  What factors 
should inform such differential treatment?  It seems appropriate that the 
regulation of the property interest in non-renewable groundwater should 
consider not only the priorities of the past, but also those of the future.  The 
former are immovable; the latter engage questions of reasonableness and 
beneficial use, and can change over time.  Permanent depletion may force 
priority to look both ways in time. 
Such clarity in quantity and in time can be accomplished under existing 
                                                          
 302.  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(f).   
 303.  Id. § 82a-711; see supra text accompanying notes 129–32.   
 304.  The Sheridan County-6 LEMA overlies one such area.  See LEMA Order, supra note 170, 
at 2, 14–15. 
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law; it is largely a matter of political will.  On his own, or upon the 
recommendation of a GMD or its voters, the chief engineer could initiate 
proceedings for an IGUCA
305
 and issue an IGUCA order imposing 
reductions in pumping to address the disparity between pumping and supply 
that produces unreasonable groundwater declines.
306
  Likewise, a GMD can 
initiate similar action by recommending the approval of a local enhanced 
management plan to the chief engineer through the LEMA process.
307
  Both 
an IGUCA and a LEMA can be as large as the GMD itself; there is no limit 
to their size, as long as they are contained within the boundaries of a 
GMD.
308
  At this most ambitious level, the chief engineer and the GMDs, 
acting together, could produce an administrative result nearly equivalent to a 
groundwater basin adjudication. 
Absent this level of ambition, more modest means could achieve such 
clarity.  Thanks to the unusual detail of Kansas water rights information and 
water use data, one relatively straightforward approach beckons.  Because 
the KWAA has required the submission of water use reports since 1988, the 
record of actual water usage for each non-domestic water right across the 
Ogallala is a detailed one.
309
  This record, a data set produced by the owners 
of the water rights themselves, enables a historical comparison between the 
“paper water” of a right’s authorized quantities and the actual quantities of 
“wet water” that have been put to beneficial use under that right since 1988.  
The Kansas Geological Survey (KGS) has already taken steps to quantify 
this discrepancy.
310
  Two GMDs have established regulations that adopt by 
reference KGS groundwater data concerning the amount of and the 
percentage change in the saturated thickness of the Ogallala.
311
  Building on 
these regulations, the GMDs and DWR could cooperatively adopt all of the 
relevant hydrological data of the KGS and the United States Geological 
Survey concerning the state of the aquifer, including groundwater models 
that evaluate the hydrological consequences of reductions in pumping.
312
  
                                                          
 305.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036. 
 306.  Id. § 82a-1038(b); see supra text accompanying notes 165–67. 
 307.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041; see supra text accompanying notes 172–80. 
 308.  Id. §§ 82a-1036, -1041(a)(1)-(2).   
 309.  Id. § 82a-732 (L. 1988, ch. 395, § 1).   
 310.  See, e.g., Normal Precipitation (2010) Water Use to Appropriation Ratio, KAN. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, available at 
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/HPA_Atlas/Water%20Rights%20and%20Water%20Use/index.ht
ml#Normal%2520Precipitation%2520%25282010%2529%2520Water%2520Use%2520to%2520Ap
propriation%2520Ratio.jpg (last accessed March 29, 2014). 
 311.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-21-8, 5-21-9 (GMD1); id. § 5-23-15 (GMD3). 
 312.  See, e.g., LEMA Order, supra note 170, at 12, 26 (stipulating to the use of the Northwest 
Kansas Model; accepting it as “an adequate predictor” of the effects of groundwater pumping). 
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Such an approach could significantly reduce the scope of potential technical 
conflicts over such reductions; in the event of litigation, it could 
significantly reduce the evidentiary burden for the parties by establishing a 
stipulated hydrological record.  In Idaho, the Department of Water 
Resources and the University of Idaho have jointly produced a groundwater 
model “that all stakeholders have broadly accepted for use in analyzing 
alternative plans and policies.”
313
  It seems difficult to question adopting 
hydrological reality and regulating accordingly.  The government cannot 
take what the property cannot yield. 
A final historical observation concerns the public.  Because water is an 
inherently public resource, considerations of the public and the public 
interest have long played a central role in the administration of western 
water law.
314
  Yet the groundwater revolution weakened that role.
315
  
Because that revolution has produced a condition of permanent depletion, it 
has returned us to the original western condition of permanent water 
scarcity, and that return requires the restoration of the importance of the 
public. 
The framers of the KWAA viewed the relationship between water 
rights, the state, and the public as an integrated and interdependent one.  The 
KWAA dedicated all of the state’s waters to the use of the people of the 
state; that use was impliedly a private use by water rights owners, subject to 
the control and regulation of the state.
316
  However, the state’s purpose in 
such control and regulation was not merely to transform an unclaimed public 
resource into discrete private property rights.  The KWAA depends upon the 
premise that all unused water belongs to all of the people of the state, subject 
to state regulation: “[t]his is the heart of the statute.”
317
  The state, through 
                                                          
 313.  Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Economics: An Assessment of River Calls and the South 
Platte Well Shut-Down, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 181, 188 (2008) (citing Donna M. Cosgrove & 
Gary S. Johnson, Aquifer Management Zones Based on Simulated Surface Water Response 
Functions, 131 J. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MGMT. 89, 99 (2005)). 
 314.  Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910) (finding the public interest 
“should be read broadly in order to secure the greatest possible benefit from [the public waters] for 
the public”); see also Samuel C. Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil, Sea, and Seashore, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 425, 430–40 (1934) (noting prominent judicial reactions against excessively private 
constructions of the prior appropriation doctrine); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449–50 (Idaho 
1985) (construing broadly the statutory term “local public interest” to discourage waste and 
encourage conservation). 
 315.  For a recent review of the concept of the public interest in western water law, see Michelle 
Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes and “Public 
Interest” Review Cannot Protect the Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 
307–27 (2013). 
 316.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (L. 1945, ch. 390, § 2); 1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 46. 
 317.  State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440, 447 (Kan. 1949). 
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the chief engineer, has a complementary duty to control, conserve, regulate, 
and allot the state’s waters for the benefits and beneficial uses of “all of its 
inhabitants,” and not just its water rights owners.
318
  The KWAA sought to 
“establish principles for appropriation and use of water with a view toward 
conservation of this natural resource for the greatest benefit of its 
people . . . .”
319
  Like other western water law codes, the KWAA made it 
clear that the private use of water would be regulated by the state so as to 
ensure that such use would benefit the community as a whole, and not just 
the owner of the water right.  That is why the public retains an interest in 
every water right, and why water rights are defined in terms of the public 
interest.
320
  This is basic western water law.
321
  The state can rededicate its 
waters to the public, subject to vested rights; indeed, that is what the KWAA 




In a surface water system, the relationship between water rights, the 
state, and the public is clearly apparent.  The diversion of water from an 
upstream tributary diminishes the flow of both near and distant rivers “by a 
certain amount,” and that diversion affects the owners of downstream rights 
and the public accordingly.
323
  The same goes for upstream diversions of 
alluvial groundwater.  In either hydrologic situation, upstream diversions can 
become sufficiently damaging to downstream interests such that the state 
itself takes legal action.
324
  Importantly, it does so on behalf of all of its 
citizens, and not just its water rights owners.
325
  The state as a whole is more 
                                                          
 318.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706; 1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 46. 
 319.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 52. 
 320.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711(a) (2013); Id. § 82a-708b.  See also supra text accompanying 
notes 94–95, 104–06. 
 321.  See, e.g., SAX, THOMPSON, LESHY, AND ABRAMS, supra note 14, at v.   
 322.  Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 591 (Kan. 1962); F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. 
Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164,1170 (Kan. 1981) (discussing Williams and other apposite cases). 
 323.  1944 REPORT, supra note 24, at 53. 
 324.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), and Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 
(1943) (both brought by Kansas, seeking the equitable apportionment of the Arkansas River in 
response to upstream surface water diversions by Colorado); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 
(1983) (brought by Texas to enforce the Pecos River Compact against New Mexico and to reduce 
groundwater pumping in the New Mexico portion of the Pecos River Basin); Kansas v. Colorado, 
514 U.S. 673 (1995) (brought by Kansas to enforce the Arkansas River Compact and to reduce 
excessive pumping of alluvial groundwater); Kansas v. Nebraska, 525 U.S. 1101 (1999), 538 U.S. 
720 (2003), and Kansas v. Nebraska, 131 S. Ct. 1847 (2011) (both brought by Kansas to enforce the 
Republican River Compact against Nebraska and to reduce groundwater pumping in the Nebraska 
portion of the Republican River). 
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than a mere agent or trustee for its private water rights owners.
326
 
Yet the groundwater revolution complicated this relationship.  The more 
attenuated hydrological connection between the Ogallala and down-gradient 
water rights brought with it a similarly attenuated civic relationship between 
Ogallala pumpers, distant water rights, and the public.  Like legislation in 
other Ogallala states, the GMD Act acknowledged the importance of distinct 
local groundwater communities; yet it also placed their interests as coequal 
or superior to that of the state as a whole.
327
  Just as importantly, those 
communities were not composed of “inhabitants” or citizens; rather, the 
voting membership of GMDs is limited to landowners and owners of water 
rights.
328
  The dominance of groundwater irrigation in Kansas has thus 
produced polarities that the architects of the KWAA could not have 
foreseen: it produced two distinct publics, with competing notions of the 
public itself.  The first was a statewide public as envisioned by the KWAA, 
predicated upon the hydrological interdependence of all of the water rights 
across a river system, and equally predicated upon the need to consider the 
interests of this statewide public independently from the private interests of 
water rights owners.  The second is a set of localized publics, grouped above 
regions of the Ogallala in western Kansas, and effectively controlled by 
private property interests that are under far less of an obligation to consider 
wider public interests.  In light of these distinct publics, the depletion of the 
Ogallala in western Kansas is less of a story about the long-term failure of 
collective action at the state level than it is about the short-term success of 
collective inaction at the local level. 
Yet depletion is a statewide problem, and it affects local communities 
regardless of whether their members own water rights or not.  While the 
groundwater revolution produced an enormous increase in the state’s use of 
water, it has generally coincided with (but not caused) declines in both 
population growth and the population of rural Kansas.
329
  In an era where 
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 328.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1021(a)(5) (2012) (defining “eligible voter” as a landowner or 
owner of a water right). 
 329.  The populations of most western Kansas counties have experienced either negligible or 
negative population growth since groundwater irrigation became dominant in the 1950s and 1960s. 
See The University of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social Research, Population in Kansas, by 
County, 1860-1970 (enhanced online ed., 2013), 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/ksdata/ksah/population/2pop16.pdf.  With the exception of Hamilton and 
Ford counties, the majority of the counties that overlie the Ogallala in western Kansas are forecasted 
to experience population declines in excess of thirty percent over the next thirty years; Greeley 
County (named after Horace Greeley) may decline by over sixty percent.  See The University of 
 
  
2014] BEYOND DROUGHT 1323 
irrigation accounts for over ninety percent of the state’s water use,
330
 fewer 
people every year, on a per capita basis, are pumping most of the state’s 
water supplies.  Yet the effects upon the communities which rely upon 
irrigation, and statewide secondary economic effects from irrigation, are 
significant;
331
 and the groundwater irrigation communities of western 
Kansas recognize the importance of these effects.
332
  Because more people 
depend upon irrigation than those who pump groundwater, it is imperative to 
make considerations of the public and the public interest more prominent in 
evaluating current levels of groundwater pumping, and to reintegrate those 
considerations into the regulation of water rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1897, Erasmus Haworth, a geologist at the University Geological 
Survey of Kansas (later the Kansas Geological Survey), published a survey 
of the groundwater supplies of southwestern Kansas.
333
  Like many such 
treatises of the period, it sought to “obtain information concerning the 
amount and quality of the underground waters [of the region], in order to 
throw light upon the problems connected with the utilization of these in the 
development of agriculture upon the Great Plains.”
334
  His survey is  mostly 
sober; but geologists are ultimately historians, and when Haworth 
confronted the Ogallala, he fell victim to contrafactual wonder. 
The existence of such vast quantities of water in an arid and semi-arid 
portion of the Great Plains appears very remarkable.  Could the 
thousands of pioneers who traversed these regions prior to the 
operation of the transcontinental railway lines have known that the 
purest and sweetest water existed in such unlimited quantities at so 
short a distance between the surface, how many of them in a few hours’ 
time with spade and shovel would have supplied water to slake the 
thirst and maintain the life of man and beast throughout the course of 
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those perilous journeys!  But the idea of such quantities of water 
existing within easy reach rarely entered their minds.  It took years of 
occupancy of the Great Plains by thousands of citizens for such an idea 
to become well established.  Even now, after almost ten years of active 
agitation of the subject, few people outside the immediate localities 




The aquifer that put Haworth in such a state turned western water law 
upside down.  That law was based on the imperative need to establish secure 
water rights in an insecure and arid region, and one plagued by regular 
drought.  It has adjusted fitfully and belatedly to the contradictions of the 
Ogallala, because the Ogallala has defied aridity and even drought by 
fulsomely irrigating many of the driest yet most fertile regions of the Great 
Plains for over two generations.  But now that the Ogallala is dying out, the 
drought has gone underground, and permanently so. 
This article has attempted to convey that the legal crisis over the 
Ogallala is rooted in an unwillingness to recognize and to confront the 
temporal aspects of its contradictions.  We know how and why western 
water law has changed over time; we know how and why the Ogallala has 
changed over time; and we know that these changes are inherently 
interrelated.  These are matters of historical record, not ideology.  The short-
lived historical anomaly of the groundwater revolution has produced a 
condition of permanent scarcity and depletion.  As a result, the need for 
sound and secure water rights is more pressing than ever—for at least the 
third time in the history of Kansas.  Absent merciful acts of God or 
foolhardy acts of the federal government, the Ogallala will never be restored.  
Only by restoring our historical perspective can we honestly confront that 
depletion, so that we can clearly decide whether to protect the security of 
property rights and the vitality of the public interest in the waters of the 
Ogallala, or to abandon them both to the past.  In either case, we will know 
what we have done. 
 
                                                          
 335.  HAWORTH, supra note 23, at 46–47. 
